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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
Negotiations have been ongoing since 1981 towards achieving a Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START). During this period the Soviet Union and the United States
have come closer to reaching an agreement, overcoming several obstacles. It is now
the opinion of most "experts" that a START treaty will be signed by the super-powers
at some time in the near future. Because of the likelihood of a START agreement
becoming reality, it becomes necessary to evaluate current strategic force postures,
capabilities, objectives and missions in order to postulate what type of force the United
States must form in a post-START era.
This thesis attempts to develop, through logical reasoning, a post-START force
mix that will meet most, if not all, of the objectives and missions necessary to ensure
the national security interests of the United States.'
B. PURPOSE
Among those who follow the START negotiations and who have the "knowledge"
and power to recommend future strategic force postures there exists a wide disparity
of opinions on what type of post-START force is in the best interest of the United
States. There are even those who feel that the consummation of START will not be
in the best interest of the U.S. because it will create forces (both U.S. and Soviet)
'"Force mix" is used here to mean the number and *vpes of weapons systems
which comprise the three legs of the Triad. The Triad ^s made up of a mix of
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), and bombers equipped with nuclear gravity bombs and air launched cruise
missiles (ALCMs). The term "deterrence," as used here, includes the concept of
"extended deterrence" whereby the United States forces are positioned, planned, and
structured in such a manner as to deter aggression against the U.S. and its allies.
which will emphasize multiple warhead missiles and thus create a disparity between
numbers of warheads and launchers which could "tempt" each side to attempt to
destroy the other's arsenal before it can be launched.^
Aside from the issue of force reductions associated with a START treaty, there
has been much criticism of each "leg" of the U.S. Triad (usually by members of the
services that "own" one of the other legs of the Triad). The criticism centers on the
respective value of each leg with regard to its contribution to national security as well
as its costs, vulnerabilities, and effectiveness. The followir \ depicts the major
criticisms regarding the value of each leg of the U.S. Triad:
1. ICBMs placed in silos are extremely vulnerable. They also have a large
number of warheads mated to them which make them an attractive target for the Soviet
Union's planners. The Soviets could conceivably eliminate the ten silo based warheads
on a single PEACEKEEPER missile with only two reentry vehicles (RVs) of their own.
This can create an attractive RV exchange ratio.
2. SLBMs may become vulnerable to Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
forces. Since modem SSBNs carry a large number of warheads it is conceivable for
the U.S. to lose a disproportionately large percentage of its strategic nuclear forces if
only one SSBH is lost to Soviet ASW forces.'
3. Bombers are vulnerable to attack while on the ground as well as to surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs) while in flight. They are "soft" targets and can be eliminated
on the ground as well as knocked out of the sky while attempting to clear their
homebase by the overpressure area created by the burst of a relatively inaccurate
SLBM which has a short flight time, thereby allowing little alert and escape time.
^Henry A. Kissinger, "The Dangers Ahead," Newsweek
.
Vol. CX, No. 25, pp. 34-
41, December 21, 1987.
'Up to 192 RVs for TRIDENT SSBNs loaded with 24 C4. TRIDENT I missiles
(each carrying 8 warheads). It is presumed that the D5, TRIDENT 11 missUe will also
carry 8 warheads.
4. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry vehicles (MIRVs) can be de-
stabilizing by allowing more warheads to be placed on a smaller number of missiles
thereby making it easier for the Soviets to successfully pre-empt the U.S. forces (ie.
offering fewer targets). A single warhead ICBM would, by this same argument, be
much more of a stabilizing asset because it would be harder to successfully pre-empt.*
With the strong arguments by each proponent of each area presented above, it
becomes obvious that some balance of forces must be achieved in order to maximize
the benefits of each type of weapon while at the same time reducing the potential
drawbacks of each. It is the purpose of this thesis to postulate the plausible
parameters, including numbers and types of weapons, of such a "balanced" post-START
U.S. strategic force mix.
C. BACKGROUND
The formulation and justification of a balanced post-START force mix must
begin with a review of U.S. strategic doctrine and objectives. Presented next must
be a review of the current order of battle (OOB) of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces.
Post-START force mix alternatives cannot be presented without first discussing the
various U.S. and Soviet proposed START limitations; therefore, a brief review of the
START limits, and debate, as reported in the public press, will be presented. With this
concluded, it becomes possible to postulate a post-START force mix that can
reasonably be expected to meet the objectives of U.S. national security.
1. Assumptions
The author's professional background has been in SSEN strategic weapons
systems. Skeptics might accordingly question his "objectiveness," untainted by
parochial loyalties. Every attempt is made to avoid argumentation unduly slanted
towards SLBMs.
*Tamar Jacoby and John Barry, "A Nuclear Balance?," Newsweek , Vol. CX, No.
25, p. 28, December 21, 1987.
Initially one of the objectives of this thesis was to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of the three legs of the Triad and thus hopefully determine which "leg"
provides the "most" for the "least". While conducting preliminary research it became
obvious that it would too difficult to find reliable dollar figures that could ring true for
each part of the Triad; there simply is no standard method for recording spending,
especially when it involves such complex systems as strategic nuclear weapons.
Finally, although it has become painfiilly clear recently that the money
managers will have a big say in what shape the military will take and what roles ' id
missions it will perform (and not perform) this paper examines the issues and m. es
recommendations based on military value, unconstrained by budgetary considerations.
The latter, like the different arguments presented above, is another item that must be
balanced with the military importance of any projected system. This thesis is
concerned with U.S. strategic force requirements and goals that maximize military
potential . In doing so it may not maximize financial efficiency. But then, what price
can be placed on maintaining the national security?
2. U.S. Strategic Doctrine and Objectives
American doctrine regarding the use of nuclear weapons has evolved now
for about four decades. Technological changes in weapons and delivery systems have
resulted in changes in the employment policies. To get to the source of the
requirement for U.S. strategic weapons doctrine one must review the statements of the
national interest and objectives. The latter is found in the FY 1989 Annual Report to
Congress made by U.S. Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci:
"America's preeminent national security interest is the survival of the United
States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values and
institutions intact, and its people secure. We also seek to promote the growth
of freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies throughout the
world, linked by fair and open intemational trade. More specifically, we support
the security, stability and well-being of our allies and other nations friendly to
our interests. We oppose the expansion of influence, control, or territory by
nations hostile to freedom and to other fundamental values shared by America
and its allies.'"
The national interests are intended to be supported by a series of national
security objectives. Objectives that are germane to the national interests presented
above include:
a. To deter hostile attack of the United States, its citizens, military
forces, or allies and to defeat attack if deterrence fails.
b. To prevent the domination of the Eurasian landmass by the Soviet
Union, or any other hostUe power or coalition of powers.
c. To maintain stable regional military balance vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union and states aligned with it.*
The essential means for securing U.S. interests and objectives is "deterrence."
The President's Commission on Strategic Forces accordingly reported that, "American
strategic forces exist to deter attack on the United States or its allies--and the coercion
that would be possible if the public or decision makers believed that the Soviets might
be able to launch a successful attack."^ The report goes on to state that, "...if they
should ever choose to attack, they should have no doubt that we can and would
respond until we have so damaged the power of the Soviet state that they will be
unmistakably worse off...."*
'Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1989 Annual Report to
Congress
, p. 18, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1988.
^Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, National Security Strategy of the United States
,
p. 4, The White House, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January
1988.
^Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces , Brent Scowcroft,
Chairman, p. 2, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1983.
"Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces
, p. 2.
Deterrence is achieved by maintaining a credible strategic force structure
with the ability to inflict unacceptable damage, and by demonstrating unquestionable
resolve to utilize the strategic forces against the very heart of the Soviet Union (or
other aggressor) when deemed necessary by the National Command Authority (NCA).
The question of what constitutes a "credible force structure" is at the heart of this
thesis.
Since there has been no exchange of nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union
(or any other country), and there has been no direct military conflict with the Soviet
Union, it can arguably be claimed that U.S. strategic nuclear forces have performed
their deterrent function admirably. In a post-START environment the U.S. will have
to maintain this "credibility" by selectively choosing which forces to eliminate and
which to retain and modernize or develop. In defining its post-START force stmcture,
the U.S. must always keep in mind the elements of the national interest and the
national security objectives mentioned earlier, for it is the deterrence which results from
these forces which allow this country to achieve these objectives and safeguard its vital
interests.
3. Current U.S. and Soviet Forces
The U.S. and Soviet Union maintain strong nuclear forces in order to protect
their interests and the interests of their allies. These strategic nuclear forces are made
up of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers (i.e., the three legs of their respective Triads).
The current order of battle for U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces are presented
in Tables 1 and 2." Only bombers dedicated to strategic nuclear roles are included In
*In order to standardize the data presented in Tables 1 and 2, the Single Shot
Kill Probabilities (SSKPs) have been calculated against a 5,000 psi target. The method
for calculating the SSKPs is as follows:
SSKP = [1 -(0.5^1, where A = [6(Y *'')]/[H **'(CEP)'] "Y" is the yield in
megatons. "H" is the hardness of the target in pounds per square inch (psi), and CEP
is expressed in nautical miles (nm). Source of the formula is Congressional Budget
Office, TRIDENT II: Capabilities. Costs, and Altematives , Appendix A, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., July 1986, originally cited in Lynn Davis and
Warner Schilling, "All You Ever Wanted To Know About MIRV and ICBM
the numbers. The 69 B-52s which have been "converted" and assigned to conventional
roles only have been omitted. Bomber forces are given their maximum nuclear payload
and START counting rules are assumed as follows:
a. Penetrating bombers (i.e., those that do not use long range standoff
weapons) are counted as one nuclear weapon regardless of actual payload.
b. Standoff bombers (i.e., cruise missile carriers) are credited (under Soviet
counting rules) with whatever the maximum payload each aircraft can carry. U.S.
proposals are to count each cruise missile carrying aircraft as 10 weapons regardless
of actual payload.
The circular error probable (CEP) listed in Tables 1 and 2 is a measure of
missile accuracy. It is the radius of a circle drawn around a target such that a warhead
aimed at that target has a 50 percent probability of detonating within or above that
circle. To reflect uncertainty regarding the precise CEP of each system, CEP estimates
have been rounded to the nearest 100 feet.'^
Calculations But Were Not Cleared To Ask," Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. XVII,
No. 2, June 1973. The overall system reliabilities have not been included because of
a lack of accurate figures in open literature.
'"Congressional Budget Office, TRIDENT LI: Capabilities. Costs, and Altematives
.
Chapter I, Table 2, note (a), Washington, D.C., July 1986.
TABLE 1: CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
Missile Range CEP Yield #PVs/ SSKP Platform/ # of T'otal # Total #
(nm) (ft) (kt) WPN (%) Basing Platforms of Missiles of PVs
SS-N-6 1800 4900 1000 1 2.1 YANKEE I 16 256 256
SS-N-8 ^ 5500 5000 800 1 1.7 DELTA I/II 22 280 280
SS-N-17 2500 4000 500 1 2.0 YANKEE II 1 12 12
SS-N-18(3) 4000 3000 100 7 1.0 DELTA III 14 224 1568
SS-N-20 5100 1640 100 8 4.1 TYPHOON 5 100 800 <^(c>'^
SS-N-23 5100 1640 100 10 4.1 DELTA IV A 64 ,;. -64^ y^^-^
Total # SSBN PVs - J4&6 Lf/<J(^
1 ffc^
SS-25 6500 600 550 1 61.5 ROAD MOBILE MO -' . -^ loeP'?'^ -WO -^vcs
SS-24 6500 600 100 10 26.4 RAIL MOBILE -5-0 ^'^ -5-0 <S(0 '^0 ^Cr-Ci
SS-18(4) 6800 700 500 10 48.2 SILO 308 308 3080
SS-19(3) 6000 900 550 6 34.7 SILO -%5J>'la^ ^5.0--_;-O 2100 [i^^
SS-17 (3) 6200 1200 500 4 20.1 SILO -3r3« -^'O -«8 70 55-2 p^x&S
SS-13 5800 6000 600 1 1.0 SILO -^ L/^ -60 90 -6^ VO






Total » ICBM RVs 6812 (^U f^S
Total Soviet Ballistic Missile RVs 10368 / .^6(



















/ Total Bomber Delivered Weapons 650+
Total START Count Bomber Delivered Weapons 60 5+
' Total Soviet Strategic Nuclear Weapon s 11018+
Total Soviet Strategic Huclear Weapons (START count 10973+
C^ crOL/ CpS ' Sj (5^»*~-c «JiCi_
r.oor"^
Sources: Listed in Table 2.
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TRIDENT I 4500 900 100 8 15,.9 TPIDENT/POS 8/12 384 3072
POSEIDON 2750 1500 40 10 3.,1 POSEIDON 15 240 2400
6000 300 300 10 92,.3 SILO
Total # S3BN RVs 5472
MX 50 50 500
MMIII 6000 600 335 3 56,,8 SILO 510 510 1530
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Total Bomber Delivered Weapons 10670
Total. START Count Bomber Delivered Weapons 4753
Total U.S. Strateq:Lr Nuclear Weapons 18622
Total U.S. St.rat:egi<: Nuclear Weapons (START count) 12705
SOURCES: TRIDENT II: Capabilities, Costs, and Alternatives
, pp. 10-11
and Appendix A, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C.,
July 1986 (Originally cited in numerous sources) ; "The Yields of
Soviet Strategic Weapons, " Lynn R Syk.es and Dan M. Davis,
Scientific American
, pp. 29-37, Vol. 256, No. 1, January 1987;
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks After the Moscow Summit
, p. 13,
U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, William L. Armstrong,
Chairman, June 2 9,1988; Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of
the Threat, 1988
, p. 48, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1988; United States Military Posture FY 1989 ,
p. 39, The Joint Staff, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., undated; The Military Balance 1987-88 , pp.
203 and 207, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, England, 1988; Janets Fighting Ships 1988-89 , pp. 545-
548, Jane's Publishing Co., London,
Weapons Systems 1988-89
, pp. 7-11, 14-16
448, and 463-465, 717-718, and 721,
London, England, 1988.
England, 1988; Jane's
, 265, 268-269, 368-369,
Jane's Publishing Co.,
There are advantages and disadvantages to each leg of the Triad. Some
are major areas for concem, while others are very minor. The advantages and
disadvantages of each leg should be considered when assembling a force stmcture,
thus creating a "balanced force." The major advantages and disadvantages of each
leg of the Triad have been summed up by Secretary of Defense Carlucci as follows:
"Our deployed submarines are practically invulnerable, but SLBMs currently are
less accurate than our ICBMs. Our ICBMs have higher alert rates and provide
a more prompt response, but their fixed basing increases their vulnerability. Our
bombers are accurate and recallable, but their response is slower than that of
ballistic missiles. In their entirety, the synergistic capabilities provided by the
three types of weapons systems incorporate aU of the elements necessary to deter
any type of nuclear attack.""
The major advantages that have historically been ascribed to possession of a mix of
strategic forces are that (1) the Soviets are precluded from being able to eliminate
U.S. nuclear forces by concentrating their efforts on a "single strategic solution," and
that (2) by distributing forces on land, sea, and in the air, the Soviet targeting problem
is complicated. With the historical success of U.S. strategic force mixes being able to
deter aggression, it is likely that all three legs of the Triad may continue to play
important roles in a post-START force mix, eventhough all three legs are likely to be
reduced. The importance of each leg, as well as the need for maintaining a Triad, as
opposed to a "Diad" or some other force, are investigated in depth in this thesis, and
conclusions are drawn regarding which type of force will best suit the needs of the
nation.
4. START Limitations and Obstacles
Over the past eight years of START negotiations the goals of reducing the
strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union have come closer
to realization. There are, however, several issues yet to be resolved. These issues
involve the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), mobile land-based missiles, air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles
"Pf 1989 Annual Report to Congress
, p. 54.
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(SLCMs), and the problems associated with verifying such a complex treaty. U.S. and
Soviet differences as of June 1988, are presented in Table 3.
TABLE 3: U.S. AND SOVIET START POSITIONS





























3, 300 on SLBMs
1,100
50% cut (to 1,540)
NOTE: '^ SNDVs have traditionally referred to launchers of ICBMs (intercontinental
ballistic missiles), launchers of SLBMs, and heavy bombers capable of delivering their
warheads at intercontinental range. The United States would like the START Treaty
to limit deployed missiles, rather than the launchers for those missiles.
The U.S. and Soviet rationales for these different limits are not discussed.
Discussed instead are their possible implications, since they are the best indicator for
the final force posture.
Among the outstanding issues needing resolution prior to signing any kind
of a START agreement, SDI is perhaps the most volatile. The Soviets continue to
state that there will be no agreement without banning SDI. The U.S. position is "...to
allow both sides to continue research, development and testing as required, which is
'^Congressional Research Service, START: A Current Assessment of the U.S. and
Soviet Positions , p. CRS-2, Washington, D.C., June 3, 1988,. This document will
henceforth be referred to as the CRS Study .
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permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a
specified period."" The United States feels that after the agreed period, each side will
be free to choose whether or not to maintain the ABM Treaty. The Soviet stance is
that both sides should continue to comply unless both come to some other agreed upon
outcome. Neither side has yet to agree upon what type of testing would be permitted
by the ABM Treaty.
Indications are that the issue of mobile missiles may be resolved. The
"formal" U.5 position is to ban all mobile missiles unless verification problems can
be resolved. The Soviets favor the mobiles with limits on launchers and warheads.
Apparently, the feeling after the Moscow Summit is that the "U.S. appears to be
moving off its proposal to ban mobile missiles."'* Actual issues associated with
mobiles (ie. deployment areas, verification, monitoring production facilities, etc..) are
complex and not the subject of this thesis.'^
The ALCM issue centers on range and bomber payload. The SLCM debate
is stuck in the area of verification and the difficulty of telling conventional from
nuclear weapons. The overall area of verification poses a very tough obstacle. Both
sides seem to want to come to some type of START agreement so that, in time, all
verification issues, and others mentioned, should be resolved.
5. General Issues Associated with START
Starting in 1950s and early 1960s the United States and the Soviet Union
began to build their massive nuclear arsenals. As seen in Tables 1 and 2 both
countries now have in excess of 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons in their respective
''U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, William L. Armstrong, Chairman,
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks: After the Moscow Summit
, pp. 5-6, Washington, D.C.,
June 29, 1988.
'^
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks: After the Moscow Summit , p. 6.
"If the United States is willing to withdraw its proposal to ban mobile missiles,
it will be interesting to see if the Soviets are willing withdraw their proposal to limit
SLCMs and tie them to a START deal.
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inventories. The fact that both superpowers have agreed to embark on the START
process is evidence that neither side believes that further expansion will add to its
security, that indeed, smaller arsenals can enhance the security of each. START
presents a vehicle for both countries to maintain credible, modem, and effective nuclear
forces at substantially reduced levels. This reduction of strategic nuclear forces should
contribute to a more stable international environment, thereby, hopefiilly, making the
world a safer and better place to live.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) treaty limited delivery vehicles
and launchers. This encouraged both sides to exploit the relatively novel technology
of MIRVs, and maximize the number of warheads per delivery vehicle. With START,
this rationale will change. By limiting actual warhead numbers, in most systems, there
should be a tendency to move away from MIRV systems and to systems that have
fewer, if not single, warheads. By placing reduced numbers of warheads on the
missiles each side can maximize delivery vehicles, thereby maximizing the number of
targets the opposition must cover. This should result in strengthening deterrence by
making it much harder, if not impossible, for either side to successfully conduct a pre-
emptive strike.
Historically the Soviets have been very evasive and difficult to deal with
in arms control talks. A recent article by Ken Adelman, ex-director of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, exemplifies the determination and patience needed
by U.S. negotiators to have any chance for a successful agreement.'* Since the
outcome of a START agreement appears to be in the best interest of both countries it
is likely that both sides will continue to return to the bargaining table, no matter how
nerve-wracking the negotiations become.
In later chapters this thesis examines the targeting policy currently used by
the United States and will project possible implications a START deal might have on
'*Ken Adelman, "Arms Control: Games Soviets Play," Readers Digest , Vol. 134,
No. 803, pp. 65-69, March 1989.
13
this targeting policy. A review of how START might impact the Soviet Union is also
presented, as are effects on U.S. forces. Finally, a "candidate" post-START U.S.
strategic force mix is presented and discussed.
14
II. START AND TAR(iETING
Current U.S. and Soviet targeting policies for strategic nuclear weapons have
evolved along with weapons systems technology. With the signing of a START
agreement it is likely that both U.S. and Soviet targeting policies will require extensive
revision. This chapter reviews current U.S. targeting doctrine and investigates possible
future targeting options which may be effective in a post-START era.
A, CURRENT U.S. TARGETING POLICY
"Current U.S. targeting policy has a direct historical lineage to the beginning
of the Nixon Administration, when the first substantive moves were made to
review the 1962 SIOP. The past decade has been one of continuous official
effort to increase the range of strategic nuclear targeting options available to the
President, including an extensive array of counterforce options, and to enhance
the possibility that these options could be exercised in such a way that escalation
could be controlled.'"
As stated above, current U.S. targeting policy is mainly one of counterforce.
This counterforce emphasis has evolved from the countervalue-centered "assured
destmction" doctrine of the 1960's.^ As this shift took place the targeting data base
began to grow immensely. Between 1974 and 1980 the number of targets grew from
about 25,000 to more than 40,000.^ This large group of targets has been divided into
'Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence , Adelphi Paper No. 185, p.
17, Intemational Institute for Strategic Stud? i, London, England, 1983.
^Countervalue targeting is assumed to be population targeting, while counterforce
targeting is designed to hold military forces (nuclear and conventional) as well as
military industry and command and control centers at risk.
'Ball, p. 23.
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four distinct groups with sub-groups within each. The four targeting groups are as
follows:*
1. Strategic Nuclear Forces - Examples include ICBMs and IRBMs, together
with their launch facilities and launch command centers; nuclear weapons storage
sites; airfields supporting nuclear-c^able aircraft; nuclear ballistic submarine (SSBN)
bases.
2. Other Military Targets (OMT) - OMTs include primarily conventional military
forces such as barracks, supply depots, marshal' mg points, conventional airfields,
ammunition storage facilities, and tank and vehic. storage yards.
3. Leadership and Control - This target set includes national command and
control and leadership centers.
4. Economic and Industrial - This set of targets is divided into two groups:
those dealing with war-supporting industry, and those which deal with industry that
would contribute to economic recovery.
Examples include:
a. War Supporting -
-ammunition factories
-tank and armoured personnel carrier factories
-petroleum refineries







^Robert A. Blaise, "Historical Compendium of U.S. Nuclear Strategic Forces
Policy and Doctrine," AIM 81-T-6, pp. 42-43, prepared for Department of the Navy,
Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA, September 1981, and Ball, pp. 23-24.
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The targeting scheme for employment of nuclear weapons is divided among
several options, each designed for a specific purpose. These options include Major
Attack Options (MAOs), Selective Attack Options (SAOs), Limited Nuclear Options
(LNOs), and Regional Attack Options (RAOs). Options can be utilized independently
or in combination, depending on the situation. Each option also allows for "withholds"
for the purpose of sparing specific target categories. It is clear that targeting is a
complex task with numerous options intended to maximize flexibility.'
B. flexible: response ^
Rather than simply choosing either a pure counterforce or pure countervalue
targeting policy, a mix of both policies may provide the flexibility desired by the
NCA. A "flexible response" policy is such a mix. Such a policy would provide for
targeting all types of targets, military and civilian, and allow for the prosecution of
assured destruction as well as damage limitation strategies. Such a policy would
continue to emphasize "all-out" deterrence while also offering a maximum amount of
targeting flexibility should deterrence faU.
This type of flexible response posture has its roots in Robert S. McNamara's
tenure as Secretary of Defense. In a statement he delivered in 1965 before the House
Armed Services Committee, McNamara explained that the objective of U.S. strategic
nuclear forces is to deter aggression.* In order to deter aggression these forces must be
able to inflict unacceptable damage on an attacker should deterrence fail. To create
a force which could deter aggression on one hand, and be capable of inflicting
unacceptable damage on the other hand, he proposed that U.S. nuclear forces maintain
two capabilities. The first of these capabilities, he explained, "...we call Assured
Ki
'BaU, p. 24.
'Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed
Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1966-70 Defense Program and 1966 Defense
Budget , p. 37, Washington, D.C., February 18, 1965.
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Destruction, i.e., the capability to destroy the aggressor as a viable society, even after
a well planned and executed surprise attack on our force. The second capability we
call Damage Limitation, i.e., the capability to reduce the weight of an enemy attack by
both offensive and defensive measures and to provide a degree of protection for the
population against the effects of nuclear detonations."^
Though almost 25 years old, this type of targeting policy may still be the most
appropriate for today's forces and the forces that will remain upon the conclusion of
a START pact. The Assured Destmction forces would include some '^ f the ICBMs and
SLBMs as well as the manned bombers. The offensive aspec of the Damage
Limitation forces would include the remainder of the ICBMs, SLBMs and the manned
bombers. The defensive aspect of the Damage Limitation forces would include anti-
bomber forces, anti-SSBN forces (i.e., SSNs), and any type of anti-ballistic missile
systems (including SDI systems). These forces would target a mixture of counterforce
and countervalue targets according to whatever role each would play in the flexible
response strategy.
C. FORCE REDUCTIONS AND TARGET REDUCTIONS
Ideally each side would have a number of targets equal to the number of
weapons the other side has. This would allow for complete coverage of all targets
and would, in the opinion of many students of deterrence, maximize deterrence by
eliminating the advantages of launching first in an attempt to disarm the other side.
The reahty is that the actual targeting data base will be much larger than the arsenals
of either side. With the proposed force reductions of START, both sides would be
limited to 6,000 strategic nuclear weapons. This amounts to approximately a 50
percent reduction in strategic forces for both sides (see Tables 1 and 2). Although the
forces would be cut by about 50 percent the target base woui not shrink
proportionally. This is where the post-START targeting problem can occur: how can
TvlcNamara's statement to the House Armed Services Committee, p. 38.
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the United States strategic nuclear forces maintain the flexibility to cover all necessary
targets while being cut by 50 percent? The Soviet Union will face the same dilemma,
of course.
Despite the force reductions and the obvious elimination of SNF targets,* the
remainder of the targeting data base remains essentially unchanged. Thanks to MIRV
technology the elimination of one RV does not necessarily mean the elimination of one
target. This means that although the strategic forces may be cut by up to 50 percent,
the number of delivery vehicles (i.e., targets) will most likely not be proportionally
reduced.
A recent study conducted by Martin Marietta for the Department of Defense,
analyzed the post-START target numbers.' The actual report has not been released
to the public but certain aspects have been released and were cited in the 22 April
1989 issue of Jane's Defence Weekly :
"The report details more than 10,300 stiategic Soviet targets including: Priority
1 targets (military assets): 1,500 ICBM silos and launch control centers, 130
strategic submarine bases and support facilities, 80 operating and staging bomber
airfields, 140 medium-range missile bases, 94 nuclear weapons storage sites, 50
command posts, 2,240 key communications facilities, 20 ballistic missile defense
sites, 67 interceptor aircraft bases, 900 fixed strategic surface-to-air missile sites,
1,200 early warning radars, and 670 additional major complexes and airfields.
Priority 2 targets (Soviet leadership network): 1,500 to 1,600 targets consisting
of: leadership bunkers, command and control centers, national and regional
command posts.
Priority 3 targets (Soviet war supporting industry): 1,500 to 1,600 targets
consisting of: nuclear weapons production facilities, power plants, hydro-electric
"From Table 1 and analysis to be presented in Chapter IV, Soviet Strategic
Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs), which can be seen as Strategic Nuclear Forces
(SNF), are as follows: present forces - 1,603 (not including any BLACKJACK
bombers and counting each SSBN as 1 SNF); jxDst-START forces - 1,278 (inch 'ing
a projection of the number of BLACKJACK bombers). This is a reduction in the
number of SNFs of only 325 while at the same time there is almost a 50 percent
reduction in the Soviet nuclear arsenal.
' Barbara Starr, "Pentagon studies 'most survivable' US ICBM force mix", Jane's
Defence Weekly , Vol. 1, No. 16, pp. 678-679, April 22, 1989.
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facilities, manufacturing facilities for critical components and military hardware
production facilities. "'°
The report also detailed the numbers of targets that the United States must be
able to "hold at risk" and destroy within one hour of a surprise attack. These include:
"...eight deeply buried national leadership command centers; 25 super-hardened
ICBM strategic reserve sites; four ABM launch facilities; 37 regional leadership
bunkers; five submarine bases; 13 mobile ICBM sites; 14 bomber sites; 24 air
defense interceptor sites and 17 strategic seaports.""
Thus it becomes clear that the target base will remain large and diverse, and
will require some sort of prioritization by U.S. target planners in assigning targets to
the reduced number of assets in a post-START force.
Another aspect of reducing strategic nuclear forces is that, by cutting forces by
as much as 50 percent, the relative value, or importance, of each weapon will increase.
This could mean that with a reduced force, each side may be less willing to plan on
riding out a ftrst-strike by the other side because of the potential damage which their
more vulnerable assets of a reduced force may incur. The reduced forces could make
options such as Launch on Warning (LOW) and Launch Under Attack (LUA) look
attractive.'^ One way to avoid having to resort to LOW/LUA type strategies would be
to minimize the vulnerability of the /orces, thereby making it as difficult as possible
for the other side to eliminate them.
'"Starr, pp. 678-679. Information similar to this can also be found in Michael
M. May, George F. Bing, and John D. Steinbmner, Strategic Arms Reductions
, p. 32,
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1988.
"Starr, p. 679.
'^Launch on Warning is a strategy whereby weapons of one side would be
launched at another side if it is felt that the other side has either launched or is about
to launch an attack against you (tactical warning) or seems to be in the process of
preparing to launch an attack (strategic warning). Launch Under Attack is a strategy
whereby weapons of one side are launched against another side when it is felt that they
are under attack from the other side either by actual nuclear detonations on their
homeland or by technical indications of impending detonations.
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In a force reduced by approximately 50 percent the concept of "extended
deterrence" may become more difficult. Although current strategic forces seem to be
able to accommodate this, once forces are reduced (and target bases remain almost the
same as before) the "extended deterrence" policy will have to be re-evaluated and
targets prioritized along with others.
D. POST-START TARGETING OPTIONS
As discussed above, current U.S. targeting p>olicy includes a great amount of
flexibility. With a Post-START force, reduced by about 50 percent, it is likely that
although the basic objectives of a flexible targeting strategy can be retained, existing
targeting priorities will probably need to be re-evaluated. A target data base of over
40,000 being covered by only about 6,000 weapons (as opposed to 12,000) may cause
the targeting strategy to lose some of its flexibility unless careful planning and
prioritization takes place. In a damage limiting role, SNF targets would still be high
on the priority list because eliminating them would greatly reduce the potential damage
they could do to the United States. OMTs would require careful prioritization since
there are many more OMTs than weapons available. Overall objectives of the nuclear
forces and the nation's intentions will play important parts in setting the priorities of
this category of targets. The remaining target sets (i.e., leadership and control, and
economic and industrial) will require the same scrutiny as the OMTs.
As mentioned above, one possible post-START strategy could be to adopt a
LOW/LUA policy. These policies can be seen as contributing to deterrence through
a stated threat to any potential aggressor that first indication of an attack on the United
States will automatically trigger retaliation. The major drawback of a LOW/LUA
posture is that is reduces the flexibility of the NCA and lowers crisis stability.
Because of these reasons LOW/LUA policies should not be the sole strategy of the
post-START forces but could play a part in the overall scheme.
What type of post-START force structure the United States decides to retain can
dictate targeting policy. If the United States opts to build up a force comprised totally
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of ICBMs, a counterforce policy may seem most logical based on the accuracy of the
ICBMs." Unless the silos were super-hardened and made essentially invulnerable to
direct hits from nuclear weapons this type of force would be compatible with a
LOW/LUA strategy. On the other hand, a force made up of only SLBMs and mobile
ICBMs could be used in a counterforce or countervalue role, while LOW/LUA would
not seem necessary as both types of systems would have relatively good survivability.
Thus, the capabilities of each part of the Triad must be considered prior to cutting
forces as each has its own contributions to the Triad as well as its limitations, and the
resultant force will have an effect on what type of targeting policy the nation adopts.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The post-START targeting problems will be difficult to solve. U.S. planners
will be trying to maintain the flexibOity required by the NCA while at the same time
they will be targeting a slightly reduced target base with a drastically reduced nuclear
force. Target priorities and mission objectives will have to be clear to the planners in
order to achieve national objectives in the event deterrence fails. The structure of the
post-START force must provide a clear message to anj potential aggressors that this
force provides the flexibility and capabilities to strike anywhere under the worst
possible circumstances. It is the planner's job to take the capabilities of the post-
START force and employ them in such a manner as to maximize the effectiveness of
the force in obtaining the objectives of the nation.
Based on the discussion above, the post-START force targeting strategy should
be similar to that which is in place today. The targeting policy will be dependent on
what type of post-START force mix is achieved. It should be capable of providing
the NCA with flexibility in its options and should not be limited to only one type of
strategy (i.e., counterforce or countervalue). The p>ost-START targeting strategy may
''This would not, however, rule out the obvious countervalue capability which
does not require great accuracy.
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have a portion of the forces which could not survive a direct nuclear attack (such as
the silo based ICBMs) dedicated to a LOW/LUA policy. However, in order to
maintain crisis stability and to preclude an accidental nuclear war this portion of the
force should be kept to a minimum and the LOW/LUA policy invoked only during
periods of increased tensions. The remainder of the force should be capable of
targeting any type of target set. The priorities of targets should be re-evaluated since
the number of available weapons will be greatly reduced. In summary, the targeting
doctrine of the post-START era will be essentially the same as it is now with some
possible shifting of target priorities and potentially increasing the importance of
defensive measures (i.e., SDI, anti-SSBN operations and air-defense).
III. START AND U.S. FORCES
The basic mission of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces is best summed up by the
following statement, presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in United States Military
Posmre FY 1989 :
"The fundamental objective of U.S. nuclear forces is to remove all incentives
for direct attack against the United States and its allies by maintaining the
capability to deny the Soviets their objectives under all circumstances and
unacceptably damage the most valuable Soviet assets.... Equitable and verifiable
arms reduction agreements are being pursued in parallel with modernization
programs. The goal of the United States is a more stable nuclear balance at
lower levels of armament.'"
Although not usually thought to be one of the elements of the mission of the U.S.
nuclear forces, it is clear from the quote above that arms reductions are part of the
mission.
A START deal will effect the overall numbers of both the Soviet and U.S.
strategic forces. The post-START forces of the United States must stUl be able to
meet the objectives quoted above. This chapter considers the implications oi a START
treaty on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, and lays the groundwork for
later examination on how the nation will be able to meet declared force objectives and
intentions with forces reduced by about 50 percent.
A. OBJECTIVES AND CAPABILITIES OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES
The basic objective of the strategic forces of the United States is deterrence.
As mentioned previously, the method of deterrence for the U.S. is a combination of
a force which can ride out a nuclear strike and still inflict "unacceptable" damage on
'Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture FY 1989
. p. 2, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1988.
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the Soviet Union (assured destruction), and one which can limit damage to the United
States by destroying Soviet SNFs (damage limitation). The Soviet Union realizes, or
must be made to realize, that should it launch a nuclear attack on the United States,
the United States nuclear forces will retain the capability to unleash mass destruction
on the Soviet homeland. The Soviets must also believe that the United States is
willing to use its nuclear forces if necessary. Thus, the United States maintains a
strong, credible, survivable strategic nuclear force, which has the mechanisms built into
the release systems to allow the NCA to retaliate even under the worst possible
conditions, i.e., even after the completion of a Soviet first strike. This force consists
of land-based bombers, silo-based ICBMs, and SLBMs. This mix is designed to
complicate the Soviet targeting problem, and acts as a hedge against the possibility of
a Soviet "breakthrough" against one of the legs of the Triad.
A START agreement will cause the U.S. nuclear forces to be reduced by
approximately 50 percent. Of course, it will also reduce Soviet nuclear forces by
about the same amount. The remaining forces must meet the criteria mentioned above
in order to present a force that can threaten and therefore deter Soviet aggiession. A
reduction in U.S. nuclear forces will have numerous implications for each leg of the
Triad. A review of the roles and missions of each, as weU as capabilities is presented
below. Additionally, the impact of the START reductions on each component is
discussed.
1. U.S. Strategic Bombers
Although the detailed mission descriptions for each leg of the Triad are
found only in classified publications, the basic mission can nevertheless be determined
with a reasonable degree of precision through analysis of the capabilities of each.
The Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, General John T. Chain,
stated that "..the most versatile and flexible part of the Triad is the long-range, manned
bombers, which can be recalled, redirected and reconstituted."^ Chain also said:
"The man on-board the bomber is crucial for detecting, identifying and attacking
the growing number of Soviet relocatable targets — those war-fighting assets that
can be dispersed and relocated. The capability of the manned bomber to
penetrate enemy airspace and seek and destroy these targets — particularly the
highly threatening mobile ICBMs ~ is essential."'
The manned bomber offers many features which the other two legs of the Triad do
not. The essential element is, of course, the flexibility that is intrinsic to the "tactical"
use of a human being. Having a man in-the-loop creates several of the key aspects
which cannot be found in either ICBMs or SLBMs. Specifically, the man can be used
to locate targets (i.e., strategic relocatable targets [SRTs]), determine the condition of
the target both prior to, and after an attack, evaluate strategic defenses, and conduct
reconnaissance. The manned bomber also provides the only recallable strategic nuclear
weapons system."
The size of the United States strategic bomber force is listed in Table 2.
The force is made up of aging B-52s and new, but far from trouble-free B-lBs. B-
52s are located on 1 1 main bases within the continental United States and one at
Andersen Air Force Base in Guam.' The new B-lBs are being placed at four bases
^General John T. Chain Jr., USAF, "Prepared for the Challenge, Anywhere,
Anytime," Defense/87
, p. 59, November-December 1987.
'Chain, p. 59.
^Recallable only when operating in a penetrating role and using short-range
V apons and not the long-range, long time-of-flight ALCMs. Although bombers could
still be recallable when performing in the standoff role and launching ALCMs, this
should not be considered any different from withdrawing release authority from ICBMs
and SLBMs prior to their launching.
*This number of bases includes those which have SIOP dedicated bombers as
well as conventional B-52s assigned.
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which are located in the center of the United States.* TTie B-IB bases are located so
as to reduce the depressed trajectory SLBM threat from Soviet SSBNs which could be
located near the U.S. coast.
^
The drawbacks of the manned bombers have been briefly mentioned before.
They are slow compared to a ballistic missile; they are extremely vulnerable while on
the ground and to air defense systems and tactical fighter aircraft while in the air.
They are also very expensive.
Vulnerability of bombers to nuclear attack has been the subject of many
reports. In 1983 the Congressional Budget Office produced one such report which
detailed the bomber survivability question.' According to this report only about 30
percent of the bomber force stands alert on a day-to-day basis. Day-to-day alert means
that crews are ready for takeoff in a relatively short period of time.' Given strategic
warning (i.e., enough time to generate to a crisis alert condition), it is anticipated that
about 95 percent of the bomber force would be ready to launch. The study predicts
that in a day-to-day posture only about 80 percent of the alert bombers would survive
'Information on bomber base locations comes from the FY" 1989 Annual Report
to Congress
, p. 237.
^o official sources were found which would elaborate on this point. However,
basing the B-lBs in Texas, Kansas, and North and South Dakota provides for a much
longer flight for any missile system which might originate from along the coast of the
United States (either west or east coast). It should also be noted that there is no
evidence that Soviet SLBMs have a depressed trajectory capability.
'Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, Modernizing U.S.
Strategic Offensive Forces: The Administration's Program and Alternatives , Appendix
E, Congre<^ ional Budget Office, Washington, D.C., May 1983.
'A "short period of time" has been defined as about six minutes and thirty seconds
for day-to-day alert, and about two minutes and thirty seconds for bombers placed on
"crisis alert." The source for these times is Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood,
Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force; Why and How , p. 47, Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., 1976.
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a nuclear attack.'" The remaining bombers not on alert are assumed to be lost. This
means that only about 25 percent of the bomber force will survive and 75 percent will
be destroyed in an attack without strategic warning. The study also shows that,
although the B-IB has the capability to "escape" its base faster than the B-52, and has
its electronics hardened against the electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear blast (and is
therefore somewhat less vukierable than the slower, softer B-52), the differences in the
survivability data between the two forces are less that 10 percent, in the most stressful
scenarios, and in lost others is less than 5 percent." Thus, the B-IB will still have
almost the same jlnerabilities to attack from nuclear ballistic missiles as the B-52.
A START agreement would greatly reduce the number of bombers ft"om the
present day numbers. As a result of this reduction several bases would likely be
closed and hundreds, if not thousands, of Air Force personnel would no longer be
needed to support and fly the eliminated bombers. The exact impact of the cuts is
only speculative, but in most studies which attempt to project post-START force
structures, it appears that the ICBMs and SLBMs get looked at very closely, while
the bombers tend to be added as "alsos." This appears to be a reflection of the
popular bomber vulnerability issue which was discussed above. It is the opinion of
this author that most planners are reluctant to place a great deal of emphasis on the
manned bombers and prefer to opt instead for the faster, less vulnerable ballistic
missile systems.
The altemative to retiring a large number of strategic bombers would be
to convert them to a conventional role. Although this can be done, and appears to





Modernizing the U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces: The Administration's Program
and Altematives
, p. 107. Additionally, Quanbeck and Wood state that "..the B-1
reportedly has h)een designed specifically to increase its hardness." (p. 50) They credit
the B-1 with a strength capable of withstanding a 3 psi overpressure, and the B-52
with only about a 1 psi "hardness." (p. 50)
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be one of the logical choices, the problem of verification may make this a difficult
task. How, after all, does one tell the difference between a nuclear capable B-f^2 and
a non-nuclear citable B-52? The conventional weapons carried by a B-52 would use
much of the same equipment and would ^pear very similar to that of the nuclear
weapons. Projected over a long period of time, and weighing the advantages and
disadvantages of simply converting some B-52s to a conventional role and developing
methods enabling verification of the payload, the Air Force may come to the
conclusion that it would be simpler and less costly to just dismantle the B-52s removed
from nuclear duty.
2. ICBMs
The current United States ICBM force is listed in Table 2. The force
numbers 1,010 missiles with 2,480 warheads. Many of the latter are potentially hard-
target kill capable. The ICBM offers many advantages over the manned strategic
bomber. Because it is a ballistic missile it can deliver a weapon to a target in a much
shorter period of time than a bomber can. Because it is "fixed" in a precisely known
l<x:ation, "fire control solutions" can be very accurate. It is not considered vulnerable
to conventional air defenses (i.e., SAMs, and tactical fighter aircraft). This fact,
coupled with the weapon's stable silo environment and planned maintenance, means
that the ICBM out-performs the bomber as a reliable means for getting a weapon to
the target. Because it flies very fast it does not provide the enemy with a great deal
of warning time prior to detonation. Finally, land-based ballistic missiles have the
advantage of highly "positive" command and control, i.e. landlines of communication.
This eliminates the problem of radio communications through the atmosphere which can
become tenuous in a nuclear environment.
ICBMs do, however, have something in common with the manned bombers:
they are vulnerable to attack prior to launching. The sUo vulnerability issue is the
biggest drawback to ICBMs and one of the better arguments used against silo basing
by the proponents of mobile systems and SLBMs. Another argument is centered
around the large number of warheads on the PEACEKEEPER force (10 RVs per
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missile). Theoretically this would allow the Soviets to expend two warheads to achieve
a high probability of kill against a PEACEKEEPER silo containing one missile and 10
warheads. This provides a 5:1 exchange ratio in favor of the Soviets.
In an attempt to reduce silo vulnerability the Air Force has undertaken a
silo upgrade program which hardens the silos somewhat.'^ These newer, harder silos
are the ones used to house the PEACEKEEPER force and some of the MINUTEMAN
in force. Other improvements to the force include better command and control
procedures and equipment, and mor~ accurate guidance systems.''
The U.S. ICBMs are cm ntly based in silos at six locations.'* All locations
are within the north central region of the United States. One of the bases, F.E. Warren
Air Force Base, in Wyoming, is the home for the PEACEKEEPER force as well as
some MINUTEMAN missiles. The remaining locations contain only MINUTEMAN
missiles. Post-START force projections contained with the CRS Study , shows that the
ICBM force may be reduced to as few as about 600 silo-based missiles." Although
this figure assumes that the U.S. will not deploy a road-mobile ICBM system and will
not develop the Rail Garrison PEACEKEEPER (RGPK) system, it does provide an
"upper" limit projection of silo-based ICBMs. Assuming the force is reduced to only
about 600 silo based ICBMs means that many existing facilities would no longer be
needed. Unless the force was spread around the existing bases, there might even be
the possibility of base closures with the associated personnel cuts.
'^Evidence on silo upgrade can be found in various Annual Reports to Congress
from FY 1973 to the present (Melvin Laird, FY 1973; p. 68: James R. Schlesinger,
FY 1976/77; pp. n-22 and n-26: Donald H. Rumsfeld FY 1977; p. 64: Frank C.
Carlucci FY 1989; p. 233) The hardening of silos is also discussed in Jane's Weapons
Systems 1988-89
, p. 22. Jane's also discusses the hardening of command and control
links as well as emergency power sou* e upgrades.
'^
Jane's Weapons Systems 1988-89
. pp. 22 and 26.




On the other end of the spectrum of post-START ICBM force projections
is a force comprised of a mix of road-mobile systems, silo-based ICBMs and RGPKs."
In this projection only 200 missiles would be silo-based. The remaining force would
be distributed among 50 RGPK and 486 road-mobile weapons. In this scenario only
one-fifth of the current ICBM silos would be needed. The road-mobile systems will
need bases to operate from. One possible basing solution for the mobile ICBMs would
be to place them on existing bases. '^ Although this may be the most economical
solution, it may not be so from a military point of view. Namely, co-location of road-
mobile and silo-based systems might place too many eggs in-one-basket to the
advantage of the Soviet targeteer. Another solution would be to place the mobile
systems on existing govemment-owned land (other than active ICBM bases). This
option could utilize the "old" ICBM bases. But once again, it would appear that by
placing the mobile systems on "old" ICBM bases, the Soviet targeting solution would
be made easier because the Soviets would not have to re-map the area to be covered.
In the opinion of this author, the most effective basing for the mobile systems would
be to place them on existing govemment-owned land which currently has nothing to
do with ICBMs or other items which the Soviets might already have targeted. Ideally
this land would be somewhere in the north-central United States to preclude a very
short time-of-flight SLBM attack. If based this way, the "old" ICBM bases could be
closed with the resultant personnel cuts and negative impact on local economies.
Whichever post-START force structure the strategic thinkers and planners
of the United States come up with, it appears that the ICBM force will feel a major
impact in its current forces, as they are either cut back or have their major mission
shifted to mobile systems.




SLBMs offer many of the advantages: of ICBMs. TTiey are quick to the
target, reliable, and relatively accurate, although not as accurate as ICBMs. The
difference in accuracy stems mostly from the inaccuracies contained within the SSBN
navigation systems which "tell" the missiles their location at the time of launch.
Without being 100 percent sure of the location of the launch point, it is difficult to get
more accuracy than resides in the existing SLBM inventory. The TRIDENT 11
weapons system will achieve accuracies never befor seen in an SLBM system."
Much of the increase in accuracy of the missile ca*. possibly be attributed to the
upgraded navigation system which is designed to greatly reduce the area of uncertainty
of where the actual launch point is."
Another major difference between SLBMs and ICBMs is their mode of
communication. SLBMs, carried onboard SSBNs, are dependent on various radio
broadcasts. These broadcasts are transmitted on several different frequencies and are
thus redundant. The objective in the redundancy is to ensure that at least one of the
transmissions reaches the SSBN. Although the system has proven quite reliable over
the »ast 25 or so years, it cannot be as reliable as communicating over a "telephone"
line. Thus, the command and control aspect with regard to SSBNs, is the major
argument against placing more emphasis on SLBMs than on ICBMs.
"The CEP of the TRIDENT E is given by Jane's Weapons Systems 1988-89 as
120 meters (p. 30).
"The TRIDENT n Strategic Weapons System utilizes state of the art
Electrostatically Supported Gyroscopic Navigators (ESGN) rather than the Ships Inenial
Navigation System (SENS) found in the TRIDENT I and POSEIDON weapons systems.
The ESGN is designed to eliminate much of the "^^op" found in the inertial
components of the SINS. (Discussion of TRIDENT navigation systems can be found
in D. Douglas Dalgleish and Larry Schweikart, TRIDENT
, p. 29. Southern Illinois
University Press, Carbondale, IL, 1984. The NAVSTAR program for increasing
navigation accuracy is presented on pp. 253-255, and TRIDENT II accuracy on pp.
273-274.) A good source for a general description of the TRIDENT n navigation
system is SSPO 0652-025-3 Volume 1, section 2-2.
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The biggest advantage that SLBMs have over both bombers and ICBMs is
in the area of survivability. SLBMs are not likely to be eliminated by a surprise
attack, at least not to the extent that bombers and ICBMs could be. Of course, the
small percentage of SSBNs that could be caught in port (about 25-30 percent) would
likely be damaged or destroyed, but the large percentage at sea would survive. Only
the possibility of a Soviet ASW "breakthrough" can pose a possible threat to the SSBN
force. Because of their sea-basing and silent patrolling, the SSBN force has earned a
reputation of being the most survivable leg of the U.S. Triad.
\ ith the retirement of most of the POSEIDON submarines in the next
decade, and the introduction of the TRIDENT n (D5) missile, the SLBM force will
become a force comprised of more accurate, long-range missiles. In a post-START
force all POSEIDON SSBNs would be retired, leaving only the TRIDENT SSBNs
carrying the TRIDENT II missile.^ The technological advances incorporated into the
weapons system for the TRIDENT n result in creating the first SLBM system credited
with a hard-target kill. This hard-target kill potential combined with the "stealth" of
the SSBN make this leg of the Triad possibly the most effective and most important.
Another major advantage the SLBM has over either the ICBM or the
bombers is that it is a system which can endure long periods of time (patrolling)
without any external support. Bombers require refueling and sOo-based ICBMs are
not likely to survive repeated nuclear detonations. SLBMs, on the other hand, can
remain on patrol indefinitely. SSBNs routinely patrol for approximately 70 days and
can extend their patrols if necessary. Food is the limiting factor. If it is known early-
on in a patrol cycle that the SSBN will be required to stay at sea longer than expected,
the food can be rationed and the SSBN can stay on patrol much longer than 70 days.
Should nuclear war break out during a patrol, it is anticipated that, during the patrol
period, the NCA of the United States will regenerate, if :cessary, and the
^"TTiis assumes that the existing eight TRIDENT I equipped SSBNs wUl be back-
fitted with the TRIDENT II weapons system.
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communications links to the SSBN be re-established, thereby providing a nuclear
reserve force capable of inflicting severe damage to any aggressor. This nuclear
reserve force role can realistically only be assigned to SSBNs because of their
endurability.
SSBNs are currently based in four locations. Only two of these locations
are equipped to handle the TRIDENT SSBN and only these two are expected to be
utilized in an all TRIDENT SSBN force. Therefore, regardless of the post-START
force mix, SSBN homeports will be reduced by 50 percent. This reductir i will mean
that at least the facilities which are dedicated to only SSBNs, will . j longer be
required. Personnel which perform only SSBN specific support at these locations will
also not be required. Thus, the basing for SSBNs will shrink by 50 percent, and there
will be associated cuts in personnel. This cutback will not be forced by any type of
START agreement, but has been part of the Navy's plan for some time. The only
thing that START may do is to regulate the maximum number of TTUDENT SSBNs
the United States might use and to retire the POSEIDON and TRIDENT I-Backfit
SSBNs earlier.^' The original plan of the Navy called for 20 TRIDENT SSBNs. Post-
START force projections predict the U.S. SSBN force to number between 15 and 18."
A "cut" of only two SSBNs in the Navy's plan should have little impact, especially
when some of these SSBNs have yet to be constmcted.
4. Modernization Plans
Much of the United States Triad is undergoing modernization. The bomber
force is introducing the B-IB and looking forward to the B-2 "stealth" bomber. The
ICBM force is finally getting a new missile in the PEACEKEEPER and is anticipating
the construction of basing for the RGPK force. The SLBM leg of the Triad is
currently finishing the flight testing of the new TRIDENT n missile. The combination
"Twelve POSEIDON-class SSBNs have been backfitted with TRIDENT I missiles.
"There are different rationales behind the different force structures which result
in the number of SSBNs varying from around 15 to 18.
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of all of these improvements makes the entire force much more capable and credible.
It also forces the Soviet's to consider the possible implications of launching a surprise
attack on the United States. In this light, this modem strategic force is strengthening
the nations deterrence.
In addition to the improvements mentioned above, the Air Force is also
researching the possibility of a road-mobUe ICBM. Although funding for this program
has been held to a minimum,there are many propKjncnts of the concept.^ The obvious
advantage of a road-mobile system is that it makes it much harder for the Soviet
planners to prepare for an attack that would have a relatively good chance of
successfully eliminating a great p>ercentage of the mobile systems without expending
most of their missiles in a barrage-type fashion. The mobile system is projected to be
one with a single warhead which would make it a costly target for the Soviet planner
because of the poor warhead exchange ratio.^ The drawback to the mobile system is
that it would cost approximately $40 billion to complete, and would require about
8,500 Air Force and civilian workers to operate."
Other areas of modernization and research include earth penetrating warheads
(EPW) and the Advance Technology Bomber (ATE), otherwise known as the stealth
bomber, or B-2.^* The EPW is an attempt to hold at risk Soviet deep underground
command and control shelters, and to counteract further Soviet underground hardening
of ICBM silos. The B-2 is aimed at improving the penetration capability of the
"FY 1989 Annual Report to Congress
, p. 234.
^^The Soviets could see a 5:1 exchange ratio in their favor for a silo based
PEACEKEEPER. For a single warhead mobile system they would at best see a 1:1
ratio and would likely see a 1:2 exchange ratio in favor of the U.S. as they would
be likely to assign two warheads to each mobile ICBM in order to achieve the desire '
high probability of kill.
23FY 1989 Annual Report to Congress , p. 232.
^"Burrowing MissUe to be BuUt," NEW YORK TIMES , I, 18:1, September 13,
1988.
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manned bomber and thereby improving the reliability of the bombers to deliver a
weapon to the target." As with any manned strategic bomber, the B-2 may also be
able to track down and destroy the relocatable targets."
All modernization programs are designed to reduce or eliminate any
disadvantages that a particular weapons system may have. Therefore, the silo
vulnerability issue is "fixed" by a mobile system; the bomber vulnerability issue is
"fixed" by a bomber that is "harder" and quicker, and ultimately with a bomber than
is almost "invisible" to radar; and the SLBM inaccuracy issue is being "fixed" with
the hard-target kill capable TRIDENT EI missile.
B. ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF START
Many of the likely major impacts of a START agreement on the U.S. strategic
forces have been suggested already. Many are centered on personnel. It app>ears
obvious that if the United States is to reduce its strategic nuclear forces by 50 percent,
some type of personnel cut will come about. In an era of "fiscally constrained"
defense budgets it does not appear likely that these people could be channeled into
other DoD jobs. Thus, a START agr-jement could contribute to unemployment,
although probably not to a great extent.
Along with personnel cuts, there would be facilities closures. The old facilities
could be redesigned to support other missions, but once again it appears unlikely.
Some new facilities would be necessary if the United States decides to go ahead with
plans for RGPK and the Small ICBM (SICBM). The acquisition of new facilities will
"Penetration capability is improved by reducing the radar cross-section of the
aircraft. See Bill Sweetman, "Challenge thrown down to Soviet air defences," Jane's
Defense Weekly , Vol. 10, No. 22, p. 1377, December 3, 1988, for a full description




be costly and, in an effort to offset these costs, the DoD is likely to sell off, or at the
very least abandon, as many of the old facilities as possible. Along with facilities
being closed there would be equipment which would no longer be needed. This
equipment could be utilized to some extent in the new force, but much of the
equipment is probably old and out of date for the new forces.
The reduction in the personnel base, facilities and equipment could lead to some
form of economic savings. Although it seems unlikely that this savings would offset
the higher operating costs of the newer systems, it is possible that the DoD will realize
some savings. Logic dictates that operating a force which has been reduced by about
50 percent should cost less. Only time will tell.
One item often overlooked by many people is the high technology world of the
weapons industry. Relatively few companies have the personnel and capabilities to
produce the strategic nuclear weapons which are being introduced and operated today.
As nuclear forces are reduced in attempts to increase worldwide stability, the relatively
small group of people who design and build today's weapons systems will likely get
smaller. This means many of these talented people may be forced to seek work in
other fields. By doing so, the nation's mobilization base, in the event of a crisis, for
weapons production and development could be in jeopardy. Although it should not be
necessary to fund research and development of new weapons systems just for the sake
of maintaining this mobilization base, something should be done to retain this pool of
highly skilled people should the need arise to utilize them. What should be done is
a difficult question, and one which this author has no answer. The problem, however,
is clear: without some method of retaining the small cadre of weapons research and
development personnel, the United States mobilization base for high-tech weapons will
be in jeopardy.
C. CONCLUSIONS
Even with the modernization of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces and the
introduction of new weapons systems, a START agreement will mean force reductions
to all three legs of the Triad. Although at initial glance it may appear that the Navy
would suffer the biggest cut in its forces, from the current force of 36 SSBNs to a
projected force of about 17, a closer look shows that the ICBM force is the leg of the
Triad most likely to take big cuts. As mentioned above, the Navy has been planning
for some time to achieve an SSBN force of only 20 TRIDENT SSBNs. Therefore a
cut to about 17 is small by any standard. The current U.S. ICBM force is made up
of 1,010 ICBMs. Force projections for a post-START force mix show as few as 612
ICBMs." Thus, the ICBM force could feel a 40 percent cut in forces.
No matter which service feels the biggest cut, and how bad the force reduction
feels to the nuclear forces, it may be necessary to reduce the forces if it is deemed to
be in the best interest of the nation, and as long as the national security is
maintained.^ A START agreement may be in the best interest of the United Stated
and the Soviet Union, and if so, the United States and Soviet Union must do
everything in their powers to achieve such an agreement. The only guiding factors
which both sides bring to the negotiations is that both sides must maintain the security
of their respective nations.
The START agreement wiU reduce forces and may save money in the long run.
Although this is not a large factor in pursuing a START agreement, it must be
considered as one of the benefits of reaching an agreement. As mentioned earlier,
the amount of savings is likely to be minimal, but in this age of cost cutting every
little bit helps.
The reduction in forces should cause a reduction in personnel needed for
operation and support of the forces. It is also likely to cause some base closures.
The combined effect of these could have an impact on the economies of the areas
surrounding the base closures and personnel reductions.
29CRS Study
, p. CRS-41
^Obviously the final force mix will determine whether or not the agreement is
the best interest of either nation.
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Force reductions may have an impact on the weapons industry in that some of
the talented research and development people may be forced to find work in different
fields. This could result in the nation being unable to rapidly mobilize in the area of
nuclear weapons should the need arise to do so.
Aside from the negative-sounding aspects, the force planners must form the best
possible force structxire with emphasis on survivability, endurability, accuracy and
connectability. The force must also be cost effective, reliable, and be able to maintain
the national security objectives which support the national interests.
The aspects provided above do not pertain only to the United States. The Soviet
Union will have to look deep into its force structure and strategic doctrine in building
a pMDSt-START strategic force. It will feel much of the same impact the United States
will feel. Because of different strategic doctrine, however, the Soviet Union is likely
to feel the impact in different places than the United States. The next chapter deals
with this subject.
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IV. THE SOVIET UNION AND START
This ch^ter examines the impact a START Treaty would have on the strategic
nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. Areas discussed include naval forces, land-based
forces (ie. ICBMs) and strategic bombers.
A. CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGIC NAVAL FORCES
The Soviet naval strategic nuclear forces are comprised of 3 major classes of
SSBNs: TYPHOON, DELTA AND YANKEE.' Table 1 provides a summary of the
Soviet SSBNs and their associated strategic weapons systems.
The oldest Soviet SSBNs are the YANKEES which are equipped with the
SS-N-6 missile. The YANKEES are either being converted to SSGNs or SSNs, or
decommissioned and/or dismantled.^ This decommissioning/conversion is required in
order to comply with the limitations set forth in SALT.^
The DELTAS come in four varieties. Missile systems include the SS-N-8, the
SSN-18, and the newest SLBM in the Soviet arsenal, the SS-N-23. The TYPHOON
is the newest SSBN. It is the largest submarine in the world and carries 20 SS-N-20
missUes.
A review of Table 1 reveals that,compared with land-based systems, Soviet
SSBNs have weapons systems with relatively poor estimated Circular Error Probables
'START, like SALT, deals only with "modem" SSBNs. SALT defines Soviet
modem SSBNs as the YANKEE, DELTA and TYPHOON classes. HOTEL SSBNs
and GOLF SSBs wUl not enter into the START negotiation and will not be discussed
in this article.
'
Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89
. pp. 548, 553 and 559.
'SALT limits the Soviet Union to 62 modem SSBNs. Source is Jane's Fighting
Ships 1988-89
. pp. 548 and 559.
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(CEPs) which translate into relatively low estimated Single Shot Kill Probabilities
(SSKPs). Over time there has been a trend of increasing ranges, and multiple, lower
yield warheads with decreasing CEPs.
The Soviet SSBNs are based in only two of the four operating Soviet Reets:
the Northern Fleet, homeported on the Kola Peninsula, and the Pacific Fleet
homeported in Petropavlosk and Vladivostok. To date, all TYPHOONs and DELTA
rVs are in the Northem Fleet. The remainder of the SSBNs are spit between the
Northem and Pacific Fleets.*
Although the Soviets maintain a larger fleet of SSBNs than the United States,
they maintain a smaller percentage at sea.' While the possibility of technical
constraints may partially explain the low levels of alert SSBNs in the past, the prac-
tice appears to be related to much broader aspects of a Soviet operational philosophy.*
These low alert rates aire consistent with the Soviet Union's "...preference for
conserving its military assets by limiting their peacetime operations and holding down
the potentially high expense of maintaining a large military force. "^
^According to Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89
.
p. 544, there are 38 SSBNs assigned
to the North Fleet and 25 SSBNs assigned to the Pacific Fleet. This total of 63
SSBNs includes one Northem Fleet HOTEL IH SSBN.
'"Only a small fraction of the strategic missile submarine force is deployed at
sea." From Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces:
Requirements and Responses
, pp. 37-37. Brookings Institution. Washington. D.C.. 1982.
Three YANKEES and three DELTAs on patrol in the Northem Fleet areas and two
YANKEES and two DELTAs on patrol in Pacific Fleet areas are numbers that James
J. Tritten presented in his book entitled Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare , p.
128, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1986. These numbers would indicate that of the
62 SSBNs allowed by SALT I, 10 would be at sea (in normal peacetime conditions).
This equates to 16.1 percent at sea and 83.9 percent inport.
*Berman and Baker, p. 37. Originally from DoD Appropriations for 1980,
Hearings, pt. 3, pp. 476-77.
German and Baker, p. 37. Originally cited in Allocation of Resources, Hearings,
pt. 4, pp. 67-68.
By keeping the majority of Soviet SSBNs in port the Soviets are able to reduce
machinery wear, conserve fuel and maintain a ready fleet. It is possible that the
Soviets may operate this way in order to allow inport SSBNs to actually cover "alert"
target packages." By operating in this manner the command and control problem would
be simplified by having the SSBN tied to the pier and receiving communications from
land-line as well as through normal fleet radio channels. Presumably in a state of
heightened tension these SSBNs would he flushed out into areas close to the Soviet
he neland.' The SSBNs would depart their homeports with the latest targeting updates
a. ^ with the latest operational orders. The SSBNs would also deploy in as near a 100
percent condition of readiness as possible, having had direct access to maintenance
facilities and keeping equipment either turned off, or used in such a limited way as to
extend periodic maintenance requirements. By staying in home waters when they do
deploy, the potentially complex problem of submarine command and control would still
be simplified, and the risk of quick elimination by western anti-SSBN forces lowered.
Although no open source could be found to corroborate this "theory", it does make a
"Admiral J. D. Watkins stated before the U.S. House of Representatives, Sub-
Conr ittee of the Committee on Appropriations. Hearings of Department of Defense
Appropriations for 1986 , that "The Soviets have ready submarines in port, 50 percent
operating at sea and the rest are ready to fire missUes in port. "(p. 927 of those
hearings).
' Possibly to areas where coordinated Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) forces
could assist in protecting the SSBNs from possible intruders.
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great deal of sense and seems to fall in line with the apparent Soviet strategic doctrine
of keeping tight control over strategic forces.'"
B. CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGIC LAND-BASED NUCLEAR FORCES
As seen in Table 1, the Soviet strategic land-based nuclear forces are made up
of several types of silo-based ICBMs as well as two new mobile systems, the SS-24
rail-mobile and SS-25 road-mobile ICBMs. According to the Congressional Budget
Office, this arsenal contains no hard-target-kill capable warheads." It is possible that
the SS-24 may be a hard-target kill system if it is mated with a warhead larger than
the lOOkt wariiead it is currently estimated to have.
START force proposals project that the Soviets will eliminate all ICBMs except
their SS- 18/24/25 systems. The latter include the newest systems with the highest
SSKPs, and as will be discussed later, the extremely valuable mobile systems. As a
corollary, the Soviets are projected to eliminate their "aging" systems in favor of more
modem systems with much greater SSPKs.
'°A review of Soviet Command and Control found in Stephen M. Meyer. "Soviet
Nuclear Operations," Chapter 15 of Managing Nuclear Options , edited by Ashton B.
Carter, John Steinbruner and Charles A. Zracket3rookings Institution, Washington.
D.C., 1987, reveals the importance the Soviets place on the integrity of their command
and control systems. Out of this one can imply that the Soviets would prefer to
maintain close control over their forces rather than allow them to operate for long
periods of tim'=' out of contact and working from an operation order.
"TRIDENT 11: Capabilities, Costs and Alternatives , establishes three classes of
Hard-Target warheads. A warhead that can achieve SSPK >70 percent against a
5000psi target is classified a Class 1 warhead. Those that have SSPK >70 percent
against a 2000psi target are classified Class 2. Class 3 warheads must achieve at
least 70 percent SSPK against a 500psi target.
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C. CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES
The Soviet Union has three classes of strategic bombers: BEARs. BISON and
BLACKJACK.'^ Of these, the BISON bombers are extremely old and in need of
replacement. The BEARs carry the majority of the weapons (estimated to be
approximately 900) and constitute the greatest percentage of the bomber force."
As will be seen below, CRS force projections for a post-START force predict
that the Soviets will eliminate the aging BISON and BEAR A/B/C bombers in favor
of the BEAR G and ^^ and the BLACKJACK bombers.'* This appears to be a logical
approach and is O- , of the least controversial aspects of a post-START force
postulation.
D. CURRENT SOVIET START FORCE PROJECTIONS
Table 4 presents a candidate Soviet post-START strategic force mix which would
comply with the United States desire to eliminate mobile ICBMs.'' Table 5, on the
other hand, depicts an alternative force mix based on the Soviet preference to include
the SS-24 and SS-25 mobile ICBM systems. Both Table 4 and 5 assume that the
SS-N-20 carries nine warheads and the SS-N-23 only four. In a Joint U.S. -Soviet
statement made after the Washington Summit on 10 December 1987, the ballistic
missile counting rules were announced. Among these counting rules each SS-N-20
'^TTie BACKFIRE bomber has been excluded from the START negotiations as a
result of the SALT I and SALT n (unsigned) treaties. During negotiations for SALT
the BACKFIRE bomber was determined to be a medium-range bomber and thus not
coimted along with the heavy intercontinental bombers. Source is Jane's All the
World's Aircraft 1987-88
, p. 283, Jane's Publishing Co., London, England, 1987.
"CRS Snidy
. p. CrS-70 credits the Soviets with 100 BEAR Bombers, 50 BEAR
H Bombers, 15 BISONs. They have no figures for the BLACKJACK.
'*The BISONs and A/B/C variants of the BEAR reached IOC in 1956. Source
for this is Jane's AU the World's Aircraft , pp. 280-281.
"Force projections are taken from the CRS Study .
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was to be counted as having ten warheads and each SS-N-23 as having only four."
Therefore, Tables 6 and 7 present the same force projections as Tables 4 and 5 with
the only differences being the variations in reported SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 warhead
counts. These "slight" changes have little effect on the overall force projection.
^
''Survival
, p. 268, May/June 1988.











































sub-total Heavy Bombers 360
START count (Bombers/whds) 360
True total SNDVs/Whds 1,594














TYPHOON (SS-N-20) 5 20 100
DELTA IV (SS-N-23) 8 16 128
DELTA II (SS-N-8) 1 16 16






































sub-total Heavy Bombers 236
START count (Bombers/whds) 236
True total SNDVs/Whds 1,594























Source: CRS Study , p. CRS-57
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sub-total Heavy Bombers 236
START count (Bombers/whds) 236
True total SNDVs/Whds 1,464




































































sub-total Heavy Bombers 236
START count (Bombers/whds) 236
True total SNDVs/Whds 1,491
























E. IMPACT OF START PROPOSALS ON SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
FORCES
As can clearly be seen in Tables 4 through 7, the SSBN leg of the Soviet
strategic force mix will suffer the largest proportionate cuts if a START agreement is
reached. It currently numbers in the range of 62 modem SSBNs. Force prop>osals as
put forth by the Congressional Research Staff show a maximum post-START SSBN
force numbering only 15, i.e., a reduction of 76.2 percent.'^ By anyone's standards this
would be a drastic decrease. Total ICBM numbers could fall from the current
inventory of 1,426 to approximately 1,039 (27.1 percent cut).'* The Soviet long-range
strategic bomber force could be cut from about 312 bombers to a projected force of
236 (a 24.3 percent cut)."
It is anticipated that, in the event, the Soviets are likely to retain their most
modem and capable SSBNs and "retire" or convert their older boats. With five
TYPHOON class SSBNs already built and two under constmction it is likely that the
TYPHOON wUl be the prime entity in the Soviet SSBN force."^ The DELTA IVs are
also very new. With four already built and one currently under construction it is
unlikely the Soviets would scrap this program in favor of the DELTA'S older
versions.^' As seen in Table 1, both the SS-N-20 and the SS-N-23 have estimated
SSKPs of 4.1 percent. These SSKPs are more than 200 percent better than any other
current Soviet SLBM system. Thus, these systems would most likely be the comer-
stone of a Soviet post-START SSBN force.
'^This number would be accurate if the SS-N-23 is downloaded to carry only four
warheads instead of the current estimate of 10.
'"ICBM RV numbers could fall approximately 51 percent from 6,812 to about
3,316.
"Includes BEAR A/B/C/G/H, BISON and BLACKJACK Bombers.
^Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89
. p. 545.
^'
Jane's Fighting Ships 1988-89
. p.546.
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As mentioned earlier, the Soviets maintain the majority of their SSBN force in
port (approx. 80 percent). Using current percentages of deployed versus inport vSSBNs,
a post-START force of 12 SSBNs would have only three SSBNs at sea while the
remaining SSBNs would be tied up in port. Since a START-mandated cut in absolute
numbers will raise the relative value of the remaining units, it would appear unlikely
and unwise to retain such a high percentage of the force in port. It therefore seems
logical for the Soviet Union to increase the fraction of SSBNs kept at sea to the
percentages practiced by the United States."
Placing a higher f)ercentage of SSBNs at sea is probably not a simple thing to
do, however. In order to do so, the Soviets will presumably have to increase the
reliability of their systems to a p)oint where the SSBNs will be almost as effective on
the last day of their patrols as on the first day. The U.S. has made an extensive and
costly effort to achieve this objective, over a period of 28 years. Hence, it is not
obvious that the Soviets will be able to field a "reliable" SSBN force, capable of
extended and repeated SSBN patrols, overnight. The alternative is to either get rid of
the existing force altogether (or at least deemphasize it considerably) and replace it
with systems that are equally survivable and more reliable, or to not change the SSBN
operating pattems while relying on enough warning time to sortie the SSBNs out of
port in a crisis."
Their low-tempo deployment pattems suggest that Soviet SSBNs have not
duplicated the U.S. two-crew system, and instead rely on a single crew. If, however,
the Soviets are forced to increase the percentage of their SSBNs at sea, they wiU have
good reason to investigate a two-crew concept of SSBN operations. Without a two-
crew system it would seem very unlikely that the Soviets will be able to maintain a
"According to Admiral Watkins, in testimony before the House Sub-Committee
on DoD Appropriations for 1986, the U.S. keeps almost 70 percent of its SSBNs at-
sea at any one time (p.926 of the Hearings).
"Some say the SS-24 and SS-25 land-based mobile systems could do this for the
Soviets. Part of this argument can be found in the CRS Study , p. CRS-10.
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credible SSBN force with the amount of at-sea time that would be necessary in a post-
START environment.^
Other areas the Soviets might have to improve on in order to maintain a higher
percentage of SSBNs at sea include: the command and control system, personnel
training, time intensive refit management, the reliability of the SSBNs mechanical
systems, alert SSBN operations, and shore support. All of these areas require
efficiency and mastery to permit extended SSBN patrols which may need to be the
norm in a "weapons-scarce" j)ost-START environment.
The "bottom line" to these questions is that the Soviets have a great deal of
work ahead of them if they are determined to put a larger percentage of their SSBNs.
at sea in order to increase the survivability of a much smaller fleet. Whether or not
it is too much work, and whether the Soviets are wUling (and capable) to tackle the
job is open for debate. Given the resources that have been invested in their modem
SSBNs (ie. TYPHOON and DELTA IV) it seems unlikely that the Soviets would
"scrap" them without at least giving it a try.
An SSBN force reduction to 12 or so will free up many conventional assets that
are presently thought assigned to "pro-SSBN" defensive duties. This new "surplus" of
general purpose forces will be available for alternative roles and missions. Could it
be that the Soviets have seen this aspect of START and have been adjusting their
military acquisition programs accordingly?
A reduction of the SSBN force to approximately 12 SSBNs would also free up
a large amount of funding. Old SSBNs absorb much of the maintenance and
refurbishment budget, and crews require constant training. By removing up to 50
"old" SSBNs the Soviets would ease the requirements for training, maintenance and
overall readiness. This would result in a substantial savings, which the Soviet Union
is in dire need of (as exemplified in any one of a number of public statements made
^Admiral Watkins stated in his testimony for the 1986 DoD Appropriations that
the Soviets do have a two-crew system for their SSBNs (p. 927). However, this is the
only open source found which makes this statement.
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by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev). Many maintenance, training and homeporting
facilities can be either reduced in scope or eliminated totally for substantial cost
savings. Personnel requirements would likewise be cut as would be the associated
shore support personnel needs.
F. IMPORTANCE OF THE SS-24 AND SS-25 LAND-BASED SYSTEMS





4. Be difficult to counter-target (ie. survivable)
5. Be able to endure long after an attack
6. Inexpensive
7. Easily maintained
The Soviet Union's SS-24 and SS-25 land-based mobile missiles meet several of these
criteria. TTiey offer a degree of survivability heretofore only achieved by SSBNs, and
at the same time, they can overcome the difficult command and control problem
associated with SSBNs. The systems offer a much higher SSPK than any of the
existing Soviet SLBM systems. Thus, if it is true that the Soviets are having
difficulties with the reliability of their SSBNs, then it is reasonable to postulate that
the Soviets may be willing to bargain away their SSBNs in favor of holding on to an




The U.S. position in the current START negotiations is for elimination of all
land-based mobile systems." With the introduction of the SS-24 and SS-25 and their
relatively good SSKP values, coupled with the advantages mentioned above, it appears
unlikely that the Soviets are willing to enter into any kind of agreement, prohibiting
such "effective" systems. Ironically, it is conceivable that the Soviets got the original
idea for the development of the SS-24 Rail-mobile system from earlier U.S. concepts
along this line." If so, the United States may take "credit", in part, for the "difficult-
to-eliminate" mobile systems that the Soviets are deploying today.
G. THE "BEST" POST-START FORCE FOR THE SOVIET UNION
This section attempts to formulate the "best" post-START strategic force for the
Soviet Union.^ This force will be formed based on system characteristics and
capabilities. The "best" Soviet strategic force mix in a post-START environment is
presented in Table 8.
"Although the formal U.S. position on land-based mobile systems is that they
want them banned, there has been some indications of a softening of this position.
This was cited previously in Chapter I.
"In the early 1960s there were plans for a rail-mobile Minuteman scheme.
""Best" in this case refers to a force that has high SSKPs, is survivable,
endurable, reliable, modem, flexible and economical.
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sub-total Heavy Bombers 196
START count (Bombers/whds) 196
True total SNDVs/Whds 1,482























1. Rationale Behind the "Best" Force
Starting with the SSBN issue, the Soviet Union clearly has invested a great
deal of time and money in its TYPHOON and DELTA IV programs. These SSBNs
carry the most effective SLBMs in the Soviet arsenal. SSBNs offer the Soviets an
effective strategic reserve force which can be used in a war termination role. Thus,
it would appear unlikely that the Soviets would give up their SSBNs entirely, but rather
make the effort to use them in much the same way as the United States does, i.e., keep
them at sea. Si ce there are already five TYPHOONs and four DELTA IVs it seems
reasonable to {x^stulate a force of at least ten SSBNs, and more likely a force of 12.
This force is based on the assumption that the SS-N-23 will be downloaded to carry
only four warheads and not ten as it is currently credited with." A force of 12 SSBNs
would require much less total pro-SSBN support from conventional forces and still
provide a strong war termination bargaining "reserve" (ie. up to 1,344 warheads).^
In the area of ICBMs, the "best" solution for the Soviets would be to allow
land-based mobile systems. The Soviet insistence in retaining mobiles may imply the
intention to adopt a no-first-use policy.'' From a pure deterrence standpoint, this is
very desirable to both sides.
Although manned bombers have great flexibility in targeting and are
recallable, they are easUy targeted when on the ground, are relatively soft-targets.
^Table 1 shows that the SS-N-23 is currently credited with ten warheads. As
previously mentioned, the Soviets have stated that for the purposes of START counting
the SS-N-23 will have only four warheads. This means the SS-N-23s will either be
grossly underloaded if they continue to carry the present warhead, or, they will deploy
with a new, heavier, warhead which would increase the SSKP of this system.
^A'*hough the SSBN force may be cut by about 80 percent it is unlikely that
the pro-i/SBN forces would take a proportionate cut. A smaller SSBN force would
make each imit much more valuable, thereby precluding a straight 80 percent cut in
pro-SSBN forces. Overall, the pro-SSBN forces will feel a large cut. However, the
pro-SSBN support for each SSBN wLU most likely increase.
''For further discussion see CRS Study
, p. CRS-17.
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cannot deliver its weapons as fast as an ICBM or SLBM, and have much less of a
chance than ballistic missiles to reliably deliver their weapons against a designated
target. Bombers are also costly. For these reasons it would best suit the Soviets to
limit their bomber fleet to that specified in Table 8.
The aggregate of such a force provides the Soviets with a capable, effective,
modem nuclear strategic force. It combines the best of the three legs of a Soviet
"Triad". It also allows for economy of assets in that the force reduction will cost little
more than has already been spent, and it wiU eradicate the costs of maintaining the
eliminated aging assets. This mix will raise the overall force SSKP, thereby making
it a more deadly force." It wiU allow the Soviets to somewhat deemphasize the
imponance of their SSBNs because of the great deterrent value of their mobile systems.
Overall, this force will enhance the Soviets strategic nuclear credibility, while at the
same time reduce costs and eliminate thousands of nuclear weapons, resulting in world
approval. The Soviets can successfully get the best of both worlds; worldwide
approval (i.e., political gains) and a credible and deadly nuclear force (i.e., military
gains). While doing so they can greatly reduce costs, thereby also achieving economic
benefits.
H. CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that the START force proposals put forth in this chapter, which provide
the Soviets with a very credible force, will have a great impact on Soviet strategic
nuclear forces, as well as the entire Soviet military. The major impact will be felt in
the SSBN fleet with a reduction from 62 to approximately 12 SSBNs. This reduction
will bring with it a cutback in shore support facilities and personnel. The reduction
"Average foice SSKP against a 5,000 psi target (calculated by averaging SSKP
per warhead for each missile type and averaging these figures over the entire force)
prior to a START (excluding bombers) is 25.268. For the post-START force listed
in Table 8 (less bombers) this value is 33.404. Comparable U.S. figures are 24.766
prior to START, and 81.907 after START (using a "mean" of the projected START
force proposals presented in the CRS Study ).
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SSBN duties. The result will be a smaller, more credible SSBN force which will keep
a higher percentage of the force at-sea." TTiis force will likely be manned by a two-
crew system similar to that the U.S. utilizes. Maintenance and training crews will have
to work harder to keep the ships on their deployment schedule. Money will be saved
from the reduction of ships and shore facilities, but will be spent on improving the
reliability of critical system components. Overall, there will be a net savings in
money, people and facilities.
ICBMs will be reduced in lumbers of warheads but the overall SSKP for the
ICBMs will increase dramatically The ICBM force will be modem, mobile, deadly
and much more survivable than the current force.
Based upon the above information it would appear that the Soviets can only
stand to gain (politically, militarily and economically) from a START Treaty. It is
the opinion of this author that it is because of these potential gains that the Soviets
keep returning to the negotiating table rather than just walk away.
"More credible because it will be modem, quiet, have a relatively good SSKP,
be harder to locate by western ASW forces even in a non-generated posture.
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V. U.S. POST-START FORCE STRUCTURE
The previous chapters have discussed the background issues associated with a
START pact. This chapter presents a post-START strategic force structure which this
author believes would be "best" for the United States. This chapter also briefly touches
on the potential impact that issues such as SDI, mobile ICBMs and SLCMs could have
on a "final" force mix and the START process in general.
A. FORCE CRITERIA
As stated in the Chapter I, any post-START strategic nuclear force mix must
be structured so as to ensure the national security objectives of the United States, and
thus secure the national interests. The criteria for the "best" force mix is defined
according to the preference of the author. There are many post-START force mix
proposals presented in a wide variety of open literature. Some of the ideas and force
structures have been presented earlier. Each force mix has certain criteria that its
proponent feels contributes to the best mix of forces. This author will combine the
better parts of many force mix proposals along with personal judgments, and will
formulate the "best" post-START force mix for the United States.
Before a force mix can be built, the criteria of the force must be defined and
prioritized. Each aspect of the force is examined below and evaluated for the relative
priority it will have on the fmal "best" force mix.
1. Survivability
A key aspect of any force is its ability to survive an attack by any
aggressor. A force which is not su-vivable is a force which so limits the flexibility
of the NCA that it is of little value in maintaining the national security. A force that
is not survivable might only be used in a LOW/LUA mode and thus not be conducive
to crisis stability.
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The definition ot survivability for this author is the ability to "ride-out" a
massive first-strike from an aggressor. Being able to ride-out a massive first-strike
implies that the force is then capable of retaliating and inflicting damage on the
aggressor. Currently, the U.S. ICBM and bomber force are not considered survivable,
at least not according to this definition.' Any portion of the SLBM leg of the Triad
that would be caught inport would also not be considered survivable. The only current
forces which meet the criteria of being survivable are the deployed SSBNs.
It is the opinion of this author that survi"ability should be a high priority
in the design of any strategic nuclear force. It wit therefore, be one of the highest
priorities of the "best" force presented below.
2. Connectability
Connectability is the ability of the force to maintain communications with
the NCA, especially during a crisis. Ideally, the command and control links would
be hardened and virtually invulnerable to any type of attack. Maintaining the
communications links with the proper nuclear release authority is essential in order to
accomplish the mission. Without that communications link, the forces are almost
useless. In today's forces only the ICEMs come close to being connectable 100
percent of the time. As part of the silo upgrade programs mentioned in Chapter HI,
the communications links have been hardened and redundancy has been built-in to
increase reliability.^ Although the communications systems on the bomber and SSBN
legs of the Triad have been made very reliable, they can not approach the reliability
which is inherent in a dedicated communication line (i.e., a "telephone" link).'
'Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces: The Administration's Program and
Alternatives
, pp. 21-23 and 99-110.
^
Jane's Weapons Systems 1988-89
. pp. ^2 and 26.
*There are many very technical aspects to connectability which will not be
mentioned in this thesis because they are not considered essential to the overall concept
of connectability. To include these technical aspects would only detract from the
"strategy" of the force mix, which is the desired goal. For a description of SSBN
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Connectability must also be listed among the highest priority items in
designing a force mix. Without the ability to communicate with the NCA (even if
"communicate" means only to listen) the net worth of the force would be questionable.
3. Endurability
Endurability is the ability of the force to endure independently for long
periods of time, especially after an attack. A force which can endure is a force which
can be used for war termination efforts and, when coupled with survivability, forms a
force which projects a strong deterrent value. SSBNs at sea are obviously very
enduring forces; as discussed in Chapter m, patrol duration is limited only by onboard
food supplies. ICBMs have become more enduring with the upgrading of silos,
including better emergency power supplies. However, they still fall short of the
endurability of the SSBN. Arguably, the bomber force possesses the least amount of
endurability in that it relies on refueling in order to remain in the air. Without
refueling, strategic bombers are only capable of contributing to the Triad for as long
as their initial fuel loads hold out.
Though not as high on the author's priorit)' list as survivability and
connectability, the ability to endure is an important aspect for a force to have.
Endurability is essential for war termination and crisis stability. It also contributes to
the overall deterrent effect that the force projects.
4. Accuracy
The measure of accuracy is fairly simple. A review of CEP data, similar to
data presented in Tables 1 and 2, is usually all one needs to measure the accuracy of
a component of the force. Accuracy has a direct bearing on SSKP which correlates,
in tum, with hard-target kill capability. Ideally, accuracies are good enough to allow
the warhead yield to become so low as to preclude collateral damage, while at the
same time reliably destroying the target. In tlit currem force, ICBMs have the highest
command and control links see W. J. Holland, RADM, USN, "The Link to the
Boomers: The Triad's Best!." U.S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS , pp. 41-50, January
1988.
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accuracy. Bombers, in a penetrating role, should have the next best accuracy.* The
element of the current forces which has the lowest (relative) accuracy i<; the SLBM.
The TRIDENT n missile should overcome this weakness and place the SLBM
alongside the ICBM in system accuracy.
Accuracy affects the target set a weapons system can cover. An accurate
system can cover all target sets, while an inaccurate system may only be suitable for
soft-targets or countervalue targeting. Therefore, in order to build a force with
maximum flexibility, the force must have highly accurate weapons. C ne method of
overcoming poor accuracy is to increase the weapon yield. While ti^s method will
raise the SSKP for the weapon, it will also raise the weight of the warhead and
increase the chances for undesirable collateral damage.
5. Reliability
A weapons system that is unreliable is worthless. Reliable systems are
costly and can take long periods of time to develop. The reliability which is used in
this thesis refers to the probability a weapons system has of delivering a weapon to a
target and detonating that weapon at the prescribed location. Actual reliability figures
for U.S. strategic niclear weapons systems are found only in classified documents.
This data is collected and compiled through numerous flight tests of various systems.
Reliability ranks very high among the items necessary to have a credible
force because, as mentioned above, an unreliable force has little or no value.
6. Cost-Effectiveness
Ideally a weapons system will maximize the utilization of funding spent on
development and procurement by providing a very good product. A "very good
product" might be a system which has high ratings in all of the above categories.
Modem strategic systems are very costly. The current era of fiscal constraint
necessitates that all new weapons systems be cost-effective. Pei aps this is why there
*No accuracy figures could be found for bombers performing in a penetrating
role. It is assumed that with state-of-the-art electronics, the bomber can place a bomb
on the target with relatively good accuracy.
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is such a great debate over silo based ICBMs and manned bombers. Perhaps the
impression is that they are too vulnerable to attack and therefore not cost-effective.
Although cost should not dictate which system is best for any nation, when
combined with effectiveness, cost-effective systems are the only ones which are likely
to have a future. Logic does not support the procurement of systems which are not
cost-effective. When a system is deemed to be not cost-effective, it is usually because
there are altematives which perform the same prescribed mission, with equal reliability,
at a lower cost. Unless the system can be made competitive by increasing its cost-
effectiveness, its future is likely to be doubtful, as alternative systems will probably
replace it.
B. THE "BEST" POST-START FORCE MIX FOR THE U.S.
Based on the criteria put forth above, a force mix is presented in Table 9. The
systems which are included in Table 9 are those which are either operational, in the
final stages of testing prior to becoming operational, or currently under development
and funded. Table 9 has excluded the B-2 bomber because of the lack of data
available on a potential payload and the possible funding problems it faces.
If a post-START force mix can be created which will meet all of the criteria
discussed above, then the United States could feel secure in pursuing a START deal
which might reduce their strategic nuclear forces by about 50 percent. If, on the other
hand, only part of the criteria can be met, the United States would have to consider
the advantages and disadvantages of a START deal prior to finalizing it.
63































sub-total Heavy Bombers 246
START count ( Bomber s / whds ) 246
True total SNDVs/Whds 1,299


















C. RATIONALE BEHIND THE "BEST" FORCE MIX
The objective behind the force mix listed in Table 9 is to achieve the "best"
mix of strategic forces for the United States, given the anticipated START constraints.
The combination of forces is designed to maximize the benefits of each system, while
at the same time minimizing individual weaknesses. The force is designed to be able
to achieve the national security objectives mentioned in Chapter I, for a force which
can not achieve these objectives is one which the United States can not allow. Each
leg of the Triad is examined in its post-START stmcture (as presented in Table 9).
The impact of the reductions in numbers of each leg is discussed in terms of the
considerations put foith in Chapter III.
1. ICBMs
The ICBM force specified in Table 9 is one that, at least in the opinion of
this author, wUl provide a force with a greater chance of survival through the
deployment of mobile systems. The portion of the force which would be silo based
could be placed in silos super-hardened up to about 25,000 psi. This super-hardening
would force the Soviets to have to increase the accuracy of their weapons in order to
achieve a reasonable expectation of destroying the weapon in the silo. Following the
formula for SSKP in Chapter I, an SS-18 would have to have a CEP of about 100 feet
in order to achieve a SSKP of 90.''
The RGPK force would be positioned on 25 trains with 2 missUes per train.
The trains would be flushed out into the raO network upon strategic waming. If the
trains are unable to be dispersed, and are taken by "surprise" in an attack without
waming, the numbers which would be lost would not degrade the nation's strategic
forces to any great extent. A maximum of 500 warheads could be lost, and the
likelihood that the attack would achieve a 100 percent kill probability against the
RGPK force is probably small.
'An alternative to increasing accuracy is to increase the yield of the warhead.
To achieve an SSKP of 90 with the current CEP, an SS-18 would need a yield of 17
MT.
The mobile force of SICBMs could be dispersed on existing U.S. bases at
locations in the north-central part of the United States. Basing this way would reduce
the probability of a successful short time of flight attack from SLBMs positioned along
either U.S. coast, and the dispersal pattern would make the targeting problem for the
Soviets very difficult. Ideally, the SICBMs would be moved at frequent and random
intervals to further complicate the Soviet targeting problem. The SICBMs could be
further dispersed in periods of heightened tension, thereby increasing their probability
of survival during an attack.
The impact of the reductions on the ICBM leg of the Triad would be
minimal. Although only 95 missiles would be based in silos, and the support forces
for missile silos would require reductions, there would also be a need for support and
operating personnel for the new mobile systems. As mentioned in Chapter HI, the
Secretary of Defense estimated that 8,500 people would be required to operate and
maintain the SICBM force. The 25 trains for the RGPK force would probably require
a sizable number of its own personnel for operation and maintenance. Thus, the
personnel which would no longer be required for the eliminated ICBMs, could be re-
trained to operate and maintain the SICBM and RGPK force.
In all, the ICBM force would be reduced from 1,010 missiles to 645 missiles
(a 36 percent cut), and the associated warhead count would be reduced from 2,480 to
1,635 (a 34 percent cut). The overall ICBM force SSKP average, against a 5,000 psi
target, will increase from 56.71 to 61.14 (assuming the SICBM to have the same CEP
and yield as the PEACEKEEPER missile, and that MINUTEMAN m has no
improvement in accuracy or increase in yield). This is an increase of about eight
percent in SSKP. Therefore, the force would be more deadly (through increased
accuracy), more survivable, more able to endure after an attack, more reliable, and still
maintain its high level of connectivity. Altogether therefore, it would be more cost-
effective than the current ICBM force. This type of ICBM force mix could provide
U.S. planners with greater flexibility and allow the NCA a greater number of
employment options. The combination of mobile systems and super-hardening of silos
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should greatly reduce the need (or appeal) of any type of LOW/LUA policy being
utilized, thereby contributing to crisis stability.
2. SLBMs
The SLBM force would take probably the smallest cut in forces. The
planned fleet of 20 TRIDENT SSBNs would be cut to 17 (a 15 percent cut). The
TRIDENT n weapons system would still provide maximum survivability, endurabUity,
accuracy, reliability and cost-effectiveness. With the recent improvements to the
command and control links, the connectivity of the SSBNs is nearing the level of the
ICBMs.'
Practically speaking, reduction of SSBNs to 17 is almost artificial. With
only eight TRIDENT SSBNs operational at the time of this writing (early 1989), and
one in final testing and acceptance, there will be many years before the numbers of
SSBNs approaches 17.^ The planned procurement rate of one TRIDENT SSBN per
year would bring the TRIDENT force level to 17 in 1997.^ As long as a START deal
can be finalized before 1997, there should be little or no impact on the SSBN
programs.
START will have little affect on the SLBM programs of the United States.
The TRIDENT n modernization plans will continue as scheduled. The projected end-
strength of SSBNs will be reduced somewhat, but without the physical existence of the
"20" SSBNs, a "reduction" to 17 is only felt on the drawing board. The reduction in
SSBN bases is already programmed with the phasing out of the POSEIDON SSBNs.
Therefore, START will have the least impact on the SLBM leg of the Triad.
*Some might argue that the command and control links for the SSBNs are better
and more reliable than for either bombers or ICBMs. See the U.S. Naval Institute
PROCEEDINGS article by RADM Holland.
'FY 1989 Annual Rei>ort to Congress
, p. 235.
'FY 1989 Annual Report to Congress , p. 235.
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3. Bombers
Although the author has attempted to remain objective in the determination
of what is the "best" strategic force mix for the United States, it is difficult to place
a great importance on the manned bombers because of their vulnerability to attack
while on the ground, as well as to defensive systems while airborne. The bomber
force mix presented in Table 9 is made up of the residual numbers available after the
ICBM and SLBM legs of the Triad are maximized to the extent of the START
proposals (i.e., 4,900 ballistic missile warheads). Not discounting the imponance of
the manned bombers in locating and destroying mobile targets, it is very difficult to
compare these systems with the reliability of ballistic missile systems in delivering
weapons to designated targets.
TTie proposed force is made up of both standoff and penetrating B-52s and
B-lBs. Since the B-IB has been designed as a penetrating bomber, it has been
"assigned" a penetrating role only. The small number of penetrating B-52s is a result
of the number of standoff B-52s. With only 97 B-lBs (97 warheads by START
count), the numbers of B-52s seemed to be maximized by assigning 45 B-52s to
standoff roles (900 warheads) and using the remaining 104 in a penetrating role (104
warheads by START count). This results in a START count of 246 bombers and
1,101 warheads, with an actual count of warheads being 5,308.
The bomber force would be reduced from 291 bombers to 246 (a 15 percent
reduction). This reduction would be made entirely by eliminating, or converting, the
oldest bombers and utilizing only the most modem strategic systems available. Should
the B-2 program continue and be successful, B-2s would be expected to replace the
B-52s and complement the B-lBs. The B-lBs would then be likely to shift from
penetrating to standoff roles, allowing the B-2 to perform the penetrating missions. A
15 percent reduction in forces should have little overall affect on the bomber force.
There should be little reason to close bases and lay-off large numbers of personnel.
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4. Force Strategy
The overall objective of the force projection in Table 9 is to maximize the
criteria mentioned above which makes up a good force. In the opinion of this author,
the force listed reduces the ICBM vulnerability issue through the introduction of mobile
systems and super-hardening silos; it maximizes the utility of the accurate and
survivable TRIDENT n missile by almost achieving the maximum allowable number
(3,300) of SLBM warheads; it maximizes the overall numbers of allowable ballistic
missiles (ceiling of 4,900 proposed); and it reduces the importance of manned bombers
without great impact to the forces and without any qjparent funding increases.
The force mix presented in Table 9 is capable of fulfilling almost aU
possible strategies of the United States. It will provide the planners with a more
flexible force, in that the previously vulnerable land-based ballistic missiles will be
made harder to kill through hardening or mobility. The planners will also have the
first hard-target kill SLBM system, with all of the associated advantages that SLBM
systems have. The bomber leg will be comprised of the best possible mix of
penetrating and standoff bombers that can be achieved without relying on stealth
technology. The result of this is that the forces can perform their assured destruction
roles, damage limitation roles; they can ride-out an attack and endure long after the
attack; they can provide maximum flexibility to the NCA in determining what type, if
any, retaliatory strike is appropriate; and they can do this with only one leg of the
Triad seeing any real program changes. It is based on aU of these options available
with this force, that this author believes this is the "best" force for the United States.
D. ADDITIONAL START ISSUES
The Soviets have insisted so far that there will be no START deal without
negotiating SDL The United States has refused to include SDI in any START talks.
If a START deal is to become reality, it is clear that this impasse must be overcome.
Possibly some arrangement to handle SDI along with new ABM talks could provide
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a solution. If not new ABM talks, possibly the issue could be removed from the
START talks and dealt with in some other arms control negotiations.
Assuming that a START pact is consummated, and assuming the United States
has developed the technology for some type of SDI missile defense system, the force
structure could change radically. The SDI system could eliminate, or at least reduce,
the possibility of ICBMs being killed in silos. It could also provide the United States
population centers with at least some level of security. This would allow U.S. strategic
'orces to stand almost entirely in a war reserve role, awaiting war termination. It
'ould make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Soviets to come up with any scenario
whereby their first-strike would have any potential for disarming the United States.
With the removal of the silo vulnerability issue, there would be no need for the
expensive, single-warhead SICBM or the multiple warhead RGPK system. A retum
to MIRVing silo-based ICBMs would be "safe." Bomber survivability would be
increased dramatically and therefore much of the argument over why the U.S. should
not have bombers could fade away. Many things would, or could, happen with a
successful SDI system deployed. As the SDI program appears now though, it wUl be
some time before any type of system can be deployed, and the initial systems are
likely to provide only a marginal degree of safety.
The issue of mobiles appears to be easier to solve than SDI. The Soviets already
have two mobile systems, the SS-24, rail-based system, and the SS-25, road-mobUe
system. The United States is pursuing the RGPK and SICBM mobile systems. It
would appear to this author, that these mobile systems provide for an increase in
overall strategic stability by presenting strategic systems which are almost invulnerable
to attack. This high survivability should lend itself to deterring any type of first-strike,
as it would be very unlikely that any first-strike would disarm either side to any great
extent. Therefore, it would appear that the United States, as mentioned in Chapter I,
may be backing down on its position of banning mobiles and thus, this issue will be
put to rest.
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As an alternative to simply backing down from its insistence on banning mobile
systems, the United States could utilize them as a bargaining chip in the SLCM issue.
If the Soviet Union were to decouple the SLCM issue from the START negotiations,
then the United States might withdraw its position against mobile systems. This quid
pro quo would allow the United States to develop and procure systems already in the
"pipeline," and, at the same time, remove the SLCM issue as an obstacle to further
progress towards a final START agreement.
As was briefly mentioned in Chapter HI, the concept of extended deterrence may
be affected by a START deal. With forces reduced by about 5u percent, it would
seem likely that at least the degree to which United States strategic forces can be
counted on to provide extended deterrence on behalf of its allies would be reduced.
The amount of reduction could only be speculative in this thesis. At least one author
feels that START will have no effect on extended deterrence. Robert S. McNamara
states:
"Because the reductions in START are so balanced and will enhance the overall
survivability of U.S. strategic forces, and because the United States would still
retain nuclear weapons numerous enough and flexible enough to support NATO
strategy, the U.S. capability to use nuclear forces in defense of Europe would
remain unchanged. Therefore, whatever role strategic nuclear forces now play
in deterring the threat of Soviet conventional aggression ~ one that I regard as
minimal — they would play an equal or greater role after they are adjusted to the
treaty limits."'
There would be no simple answer to how much, if any, impact the START
negotiations might have on extended deterrence. Like other issues such as targeting
and weapons assignment, extended deterrence would have to be prioritized among the
other national goals and objectives.
'Robert S. McNamara, "The New Administration and the Future of Arms Control,"
Arms Control Today , Vol. 18, No. 10, p. 5, December 1988.
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E. BEYOND START
Assuming that some type of START deal is finalized in the next few years,
could both sides continue to reduce weapons to even lower limits? If reduced beyond
the expected 6,000 warhead limit, would either the Soviet Union or the United States
feel secure? At least one open source states that the next step for further reductions
would be the 3,000 warhead level.'" Reflecting on the complexities encountered in a
reduction to the 6.000 warhead level, this author would expect to see many changes
to force policy, str ctxu-e, employment and targeting strategy if a reduction to 3,000
warheads is ever
^
anned. The question that must be answered is whether or not a
force of 3,000 warheads would suffice to maintain the national security objectives and
thus be in the nation's best interest.
F. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on the evidence presented above, and a review of the references in
preparing this thesis, is appears likely that some type of a STAKT treaty will be
negotiated in the relatively near future (i.e., the next few years). The impact of
strategic nuclear force reductions would be minimal to the extent that the reductions
are not likely to alter each leg of the current Triad to a great extent. The ICBM leg
is likely to feel the biggest change if the United States is willing to make the
investment in mobile systems. SLBMs will feel no real change in their programs,
and bombers may only be forced to retire (or convert to conventional duty) about 50
aircraft. Current targeting policy should not require any significant revision, but the
target data base and target plans will probably have to be re-prioritized as the number
of targets grows proportionally to the reduced force. Both the Soviet Union and the
United States have the opportunity in START to modernize their forces and end up
with force i lixes which can have an overall better hard-target kill capability and be
more survivable to any attacking force. In sum, the fmdings of this thesis indicate that
'"May, Bing and Steinbmner, Strategic Arms Reductions , pp.6 and 7.
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a START deal will have little chance of creating an adverse effect on either United
States or Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and therefore, with the exception of a few
relatively minor issues, a START deal appears imminent.
The conclusions that this author has come to, and supported with the body of
the thesis, are as follows:
a. The United States should continue to pursue mobile ICBM systems in
general, and in particular the SICBM. The RGPK proposal will give the ICBM more
survivability than a silo-based missile but it will present a very tempting target to
Soviet planners, as it has 10 warheads per missile and with two missiles per train
could potentially lose 20 warheads with one direct hit from a single Soviet waitiead.
b. The United States should de-emphasize the manned bomber for strategic
nuclear weapons delivery because of its vulnerability to incoming weapons (while on
the ground) as well as to air defense systems (while airborne). As such, the United
States should stop development of the B-2 "stealth" bomber and re-channel strategic
funding into mobile ICBM systems.
c. START will have little or no effect on the SLBM leg of the Triad. A
force of 17 TRIDENT SSBNs equipped with TRIDENT n (D5) missiles will present
a formidable force and will provide planners with greater flexibility in target
assignment and weapons employment policies.
d. START limitations, as specified in Chapter I, do not present the United
States with limits which will adversely effect its strategic forces. Tlie force mix
presented in Table 9 clearly demonstrates that, although the force will be reduced, it
will be more survivable, more accurate, more able to endure and more cost-effective
than the current force structure.
e. As exemplified in the force mix prof)Osed in Table 9, the START limits
will not cause the Loited States to fail to meet its most pressing national security
objectives. In fact, the national security objectives should be met with reduced forces
without many changes to existing strategies. The weapons ceilings which may come
with the signing of a START deal will still allow the United States to design a robust
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strategic nuclear force which will be quite capable of securing the national interest.
As such, it is this author's conclusion, that the START negotiations should continue
and all obstacles overcome in order to achieve a completed START agreement. A
completed START agreement, if near to the proposed form presented in Chapter I, is
in the best interest of the United States and also appears to be in the best interest of
the Soviet Union. It is in the best interest of both nations because the resultant forces
would be smaller, thereby reducing the possibility of accidental launching, more cost-
effective in that they will be more f rvivable, and more accurate, thus making them
more flexible to planners. The reduction in forces may also present some monetary
savings by eliminating the maintenance of aging systems. These savings are likely to
be offset, however, by the rising costs of newer, more complex and more reliable
systems.
The force mix presented in Table 9 is but one example of the type of force mix
which could be constructed while staying within the limits of the current START
proposal limitations. Many other force mixes could be constmcted with emphasis on
different systems. The flexibility which these limitations still allow is the primary
reason why the START negotiations should continue. When either side can maintain
their nation's security, and thus their national interests, while at the same time reducing
their strategic nuclear arsenals, it is the best interest of these nations to do so.
Pursuing an agreeable START deal should culminate in achieving these reduced forces
without reducing either nation's security.
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